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Abstract

Social media datasets are fundamental to understanding a variety of phenomena, such as
epidemics [1], adoption of behavior [2], crowd management [3], and political uprisings [4]. At
the same time, many such datasets capturing computer-mediated social interactions are recorded
nowadays by individual researchers or by organizations. However, while the need for real social
graphs and the supply of such datasets are well established, the flow of data from data owners to
researchers is significantly hampered by privacy risks: even when humans’ identities are removed, or
data is anonymized to some extent, studies have proven repeatedly that re-identifying anonymized
user identities (i.e., de-anonymization) is doable with high success rate [5, 6, 7, 8].
A main research challenge is to develop a principled understanding of how to measure the effectiveness of an anonymization scheme and thus, conversely, the likely success of a de-anonymization
attack [9]. This dissertation develops methods to understand what makes some graph datasets more
resilient to de-anonymization attacks. We propose a data-driven framework to 1) quantify the vulnerability of a graph to a re-identification attack; 2) quantitatively identify which graph structural
properties contribute most to graph vulnerability; and 3) propose guidelines to develop new methodologies related to graph anonymization, de-anonymization and graph vulnerability quantification.
We show the usefulness of this framework on a large set of synthetically generated graphs with controlled propertied inspired from a set of real social networks. Thus, we provide an unified framework
to analyze the privacy/utility trade-off imposed on any family of social graphs.
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We extend this data-driven framework for networks with node attributes. Using this improved framework, we quantify how much better a node re-identification attack performs when the
node attributes are included in the attack compared to when there is no node attribute information
available to the attacker. We quantify the privacy impact of node attributes under an attribute
attachment model biased towards homophily, and analyze the interplay between graph structures
and attribute information. Our results show that binary node attributes increase the chance of
revealing node identity independent of their placements in the network. Further, we show that
other network properties independent of the degree distribution put node privacy at risk. This
improves the current understanding of graph privacy, as it means that protecting graph privacy is
much harder than previously considered [10, 11].
Once privacy is guaranteed to a certain level, social media datasets are useful for various
studies. One such important study is to analyze and model the information spreading patterns on
social networks. Understanding how information (e.g., opinions, rumours, etc.) spreads on social
networks has many benefits ranging from controlling the spread of bad rumour [12], identifying
influential spreaders [13], reducing the harm of an outbreak, etc. [14]. Although there are a variety
of classical diffusion models developed for epidemic spreading [15], they are not representative for
capturing the information spread in social media. This dissertation contributes to the development
of data-driven models to predict social media activity.
In this line of work, we first develop methods to forecast how conversations will evolve on a
social media platform. Given a set of original posts on a social platform, such as posts on Reddit
in a continuous interval of time, we predict the conversation trees rooted in these seeds. For each
conversation, we predict the final shape of the message tree, the user who posts each message, and
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the time (in continuous space) of the posting of each message. Our solution uses a probabilistic
generative model with the support of a genetic algorithm and Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM)
neural networks. We evaluate the proposed approach on real world conversations as appeared on
subreddits related to crypto-currency and cyber-security on Reddit. We show that this technique
can generate accurate conversation topological structures over time, and can accurately predict the
volume of messages and the engagement of users over time.
We improve this technique to predict the Twitter activities per topic of interest during a
political crisis period. By their nature, periods of crisis do not include many repeatable events, thus
it is difficult to learn and predict how social media users react. We use external events information as
seen through the lens of physical conflict and news when improving the simulator design. Specifically,
we use the time-aligned exogenous signals to predict when tweets are posted, in which topic, and
by which user. We use the previously developed cascade generation model to predict the resharing
activity. We evaluate this finer-granularity of simulations by the volume and temporal pattern of
Twitter discussions, new user engagements and the structure of user interaction network. We show
on Twitter data collected during the Venezuela political crisis that our model generates activities
that follow the ground truth.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Social media platforms such as Twitter, Reddit, YouTube, and Facebook are popular over
the last few years because they offer useful services for people to connect and interact with each
other. These platforms offer large network datasets that often represent social interactions between
real-world entities like friendship, follower, and professional relations. These datasets are helpful for
a variety of research studies such as community evolution [16], opinion polarization [17], disaster
response [18], racial/ethnic disparities [19], stress detection [20], etc.
This dissertation focuses on two important studies of social media: protecting privacy of
individuals in publicly available social network data, and simulating online user activity in various
social media platforms. The first study was motivated by the access and privacy issues of social
network data due to the sensitive information they capture. For example, there are serious privacy
issues raised when social network data leaks political leanings, sexual preferences, corporate credentials, etc. [21]. The second study aims to accurately model information dissemination in social
media across various contexts. Being able to forecast social media activity in the future has immediate applications. For example, platform curators can predict users who may post inflammatory
messages in a conversation, and monitor/censor their activity. Other benefits include the evaluation
of intervention strategies to limit disinformation.
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1.1

Privacy of Social Network Data
Social networks have substantial scientific value to the research community but public re-

lease of such data may jeopardize the privacy of individuals. There are numerous ways that privacy
can be breached. For example, an adversary might be interested to find out whether a particular
user is active on a certain political forum, or whether there is a relationship between two users
in a dating network, or whether a group of users in a neighborhood voted for a particular candidate. A number of data protection methods have been proposed to mitigate the privacy invasion
of individuals [22]. For example, a user’s identity may be protected via naive sanitizing, by simply
removing the identifiable attributes from the publicly available data, or by structural anonymization, in which nodes and edges in the social network are removed/inserted to obscure the original
topological structure. However, data breaches happen regularly where adversaries use sophisticated
techniques to defeat data protection mechanisms. The de-anonymization attack on Data for Development (D4D) challenge data [23] is a good example on breaching the privacy of individuals
from poorly sanitized public data. The D4D datasets represent "anonymized" call records and SMS
exchanges that were extracted from the users of major communication network in the Ivory Coast.
Yet the adversaries revealed the identity of users using a powerful de-anonymization attack [24].
They used the information from different anonymized subgraphs to decode the anonymized user
accounts.
An important question is how to effectively anonymize graphs without destroying their utility [25]. For example, preserving particular network characteristics (e.g., degree distribution, clustering, etc.) in the anonymized graph is important for the end application. Typically, to the extent
these methods preserve utility, the anonymized graphs are vulnerable to modern de-anonymization
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atacks [9]. What is not well understood, however, is the interplay between the anonymity guarantees
that these anonymization methods provide vs. the strength of the attack and the particularities
of the dataset to be anonymized. Or, whether some networks are inherently more "anonymizable," that is, immune to strong attacks even using weak structural anonymization schemes. A
main research challenge is to develop a principled understanding of how to measure the effectiveness of an anonymization scheme and thus, conversely, the likely success of a de-anonymization
attack. In this dissertation, we try to understand what makes some graph datasets more resilient
to de-anonymization attacks.

1.2

Simulating Social Media Activity
Understanding how information is disseminated in online social environments has significant

real-world impact, from health care to marketing. Significant effort has been invested in characterizing information diffusion in various platforms. For example, Cheng et al. [26] characterized
the types of information cascades in Facebook. They showed the types of cascades depend on the
factors related to the effort and social cost of user participation. Zuo et al. [27] studied the social
contagion of cheating behavior in online gaming platforms. Vosoughi et al. [28] determined based
on a collection of tweets of political news that false information spreads faster, farther, deeper and
broader than true facts. This phenomenon may be explained by human factors such as emotional
reaction to surprise, fear and disgust that are more likely induced by fabricated news.
Our goal is to develop a social simulator that captures the information dissemination within
and across various social media platforms. A simulator is more useful when it is able to predict
realistic online user activities at fine granularity (who responds to whom on which topic, and when)
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in a future time horizon without having the ground truth activity. Although simple to state, this
granularity of predictions is shown [29] to be difficult to make in part because of the irregular
patterns of information flows due to the influence of both internal and external factors, and in
part because different social platforms have different algorithms for content promotion. A reliable
simulator can realistically respond to internal and external stimuli by: 1) capturing peaks of activity
on particular subjects of interest; 2) responding realistically to the timing of external events and
internal amplified discussions; 3) capturing activity per topic, where topics can be loosely related;
and 4) representing accurately the size of the newly engaged audience, that can vary significantly
over time and with topics.
Simulating user activities in online social media platforms has many benefits. These predictions can be used to study "what if" scenarios in an operational setup. For example, what response
would be generated if a particular post is made by a particular user account? That is, how large of
a reaction would that generate in terms of messages and user engagement over time? What if that
same message is posted by a different user? (say, a government organization vs. a bot account?).
On the other hand, researchers could test the effects of intervening within the platform to influence
activity: would the blocking of some accounts significantly impact a disinformation campaign? How
late in an information operation would an intervention be effective, knowing that it may take some
time to identify the information campaign and its operators? Other applications for such a simulator include generating realistic datasets for filling in gaps in data collected for various scientific
enquiries; studying cross platform information diffusion; or identifying users who aim to promote
violence during an election season.
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1.3

Contributions and Outline
We make multiple contributions in this dissertation towards developing data-driven models

using social network data.

• Chapter 2 introduces a data-driven framework to measure privacy and utility on network data.
We develop methods to examine the interplay between graph properties and the vulnerability
to de-anonymization attacks. We demonstrate its applicability via extensive experiments on
thousands of graphs with controlled properties generated from real datasets. In addition,
we show empirically that there are structural properties that affect graph vulnerability to
re-identification attacks independent of degree distribution.
• Chapter 3 extends this framework to explore the interplay between graph topology and attribute placement with respect to the anonymity. We quantitatively study the impact of
binary node attributes on node privacy. Our experiments show that the population’s diversity
on the binary attributes consistently degrades anonymity. The content of these two chapters
is primarily based on our published work [30, 31, 32].
• Chapter 4 introduces the related problems of simulating social media activity. We describe
the challenges in this problem space, discuss the related attempts, and explain the problem
scenarios that motivate the design of social simulators developed as a part of this dissertation.
• Chapter 5 proposes a data-driven method that forecasts groups of topic-related, overlapping,
online conversation trees on Reddit. Our method is generative: given a group of original
posts, it generates the resulting conversation threads with timing and authorship information.
We demonstrate using two large datasets from Reddit that the microscopic properties of
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such groups of conversations can be accurately predicted when starting from the original
posts, without knowledge of the intermediate reactions to such posts. We show that our
solution significantly outperforms competitive baselines in terms of predicting the conversation
structure and user engagement over time.
• Chapter 6 presents the design, implementation and evaluation of a simulator that generates
Twitter activity related to a political crisis using signals from contemporary exogenous data,
such as news articles and Reddit. The simulator is composed of multiple modules, each
specialized to accurately predict a dimension of the activity, such as the number of tweets,
or the retweet cascades. We use the cascade solution presented in Chapter 5 to predict
the growth of retweet cascades, thus testing its generality across two platforms, Reddit and
Twitter. Most importantly, the simulator generates activity as it pertains to a particular
topic from the overall conversation of interest. We use the Venezuela political crisis from the
beginning of 2019 as the scenario on which we train and test the simulator. We describe our
experience on building this simulator, including the failed attempts at capturing peaks and
lows in social media activity. The content of Chapter 4-6 is primarily based on experience
from DARPA SocialSim Challenges.
• Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of our contributions and the future work.

6

Chapter 2: Privacy of Network Topology1

Social networks are often mined to uncover insights about the structure and function of the
interactions represented. This substantial scientific value to the research community comes with
risks: the release of such data may jeopardize the privacy of individuals.
The AOL [33] and Netflix [34] scandals are textbook examples on breaching the privacy
of individuals by publicly releasing poorly sanitized data. The first scandal was related to the
public release of anonymized search logs by AOL in 2006 [35]. These records contained web search
queries of more than 500,000 Americans who used the AOL search engine for three months. Two New
York Times journalists matched the personally identifiable information present in these anonymized
records with the publicly available phone book listings to decode a few user identities. The most
popular re-identified account was the user No. 4417749, Thelma Arnold, a 62-year-old widow who
searched for topics such as “numb fingers”, “60 single men” and “dog that urinates on everything” [35].
It revealed that many other user accounts ranging from cancer patients, pregnant mothers to college
students were also re-identifiable using a similar methodology. This privacy violation led to a class
action lawsuit against AOL at the end [36]. The second scandal was related to the public release
of Netflix movie ratings as a part of Netflix movie recommendation challenge [37]. Two academic
researchers matched these records with the Internet Movie Database (IMDb) ratings [34]. They were
able to identify many users present in both datasets even though their identities were anonymized
in the Netflix dataset.
1

This chapter was previously published in [30]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Many anonymization methods have been proposed to mitigate the privacy invasion of individuals from the public release of graph data [22]. The accepted approach now is to anonymize
social graphs by modifying the graph structure enough to decouple the particular node identity
from its social ties, yet preserving the graph characteristics in aggregate. Various solutions have
been proposed, some based on rewiring the original graph structure, others based on clustering, and
others based on generating graphs from a graph signature. For all structural graph anonymization
techniques, however, the challenge is the tension between providing privacy in the altered graph
structure and preserving the accuracy of the structural characteristics of the original graph in the altered graph, which is what matters for their utility for research [38]. In this method, the anonymized
graph is isomorphic to the original preserving the structural data utility which in turn makes it the
most vulnerable instance to basic de-anonymization attacks [39]. At the other extreme, the generation of random graphs could be considered as an anonymization method to generate a complete
non-isomorphic graph to the original. Though this method achieves a higher level of privacy, significant loss of original graph structure may affect the fidelity of anonymized data usage. Typically, to
the extent many anonymization methods preserve utility, the anonymized graphs are vulnerable to
modern de-anonymization attacks [9]. Thus, an important question is how to effectively anonymize
graphs without destroying their utility while protecting the privacy of users [25].
Various studies touched on this problem, typically in the context of specific anonymization
techniques and specific desired utility metrics [40, 9]. For example, Ji et. al. [40] present a benchmark study on comparing perturbation-based anonymization schemes with respect to the preserved
utility and the resistance to specific de-anonymization attacks. Missing from the state of the art is
a systematic understanding of the limitations on anonymity that utility objectives impose. Specifi-
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cally, we ask: Which graph properties give away most information such that a large fraction of the
nodes can be identified ? Understanding the answer to this question is beneficial in many practical
ways. First, it can help the data practitioner in deciding which graph properties should not be
preserved in the anonymized version of the dataset, in an attempt to increase node anonymity. For
example, if the joint degree distribution is shown to be revealing too much information (as it was, in
fact, shown in [41]), then an anonymization technique that preserves the degree distribution of the
original graph dataset should be understood that it comes with significant risks in terms of privacy
and may be avoided. Second, new anonymization techniques may be designed with the specific objective of obscuring in the anonymized graph the very properties of the original graph that proved
to be too revealing. Thus, for example, if for a particular network the degree assortativity (defined
as the tendency of nodes with similar degrees to be connected by an edge) significantly helps in
node re-identification, then an anonymization algorithm that perturbs the assortativity coefficient
may be needed. This observation opens a new path in the space of graph anonymization techniques,
where the typical design objectives include the preservation of some structural properties, rather
than their explicit perturbation.
In this chapter, we propose a modeling framework to 1) quantify the vulnerability of a graph
to a re-identification attack; and 2) quantitatively identify which structural properties contribute
most to graph vulnerability. We show the usefulness of this framework on a large set of synthetically
generated graphs with controlled properties inspired from a set of real social networks.
This chapter makes the following contributions. First, we introduce a new question which,
while related to previously asked questions, opens a new research direction. Specifically, we ask:
which network characteristics make a graph more vulnerable to a de-anonymization attack? Answer-
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ing this question can guide data practitioners to navigate among many anonymization techniques
and utility requirements. Second, we propose a framework [42] that answers empirically this question. Third, as a proof of concept, we instantiate this framework by employing a representative
set of network metrics, a strong machine learning based de-anonymization attack, and thousands of
graphs with controlled characteristics. And fourth, our experiments show how several graph metrics
have a combined effect on graph vulnerability under the de-anonymization attack considered.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 presents the related work.
Section 2.2 introduces the framework and our proof-of-concept instantiation of its modules. Section 2.3 presents the real networks and the families of synthetic datasets used in our empirical
study. Section 2.4 analyzes the relationships between graph properties and vulnerability to node
re-identification. And finally, Section 2.5 concludes with discussions of our contributions.

2.1

Related Work
Much progress has been made in the last decade on problems related to graph anonymization.

To place our results in the vast literature on graph anonymization, we discuss related work structured
around our main contributions.

2.1.1 Graph Privacy and Utility
Because utility is typically expressed as (distance between) graph metrics and graph metrics
describe network properties, our question of which network properties makes graphs vulnerable to
de-anonymization attacks is closely related to the question of utility vs. anonymity. Significant effort
has been invested in understanding the inherent tension between achieved privacy and preserved
utility on publishing graph datasets [41, 22]. For example, while any anonymization scheme that
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preserves the degree distribution is vulnerable to de-anonymization attacks [9, 40], perturbations
to the degree distribution in the anonymization process lead to significant utility loss, that is, to
perturbations of important graph properties in the anonymized graphs [43]. The fraction of nodes
with only one neighbor is an important factor in maintaining anonymity: intuitively, they carry
little information to reveal the identity of their (only) neighbor [9]. Moreover, it has been shown
experimentally that utility is degraded faster than privacy is achieved [44, 38].
Theoretical frameworks were proposed to quantify the tradeoff between privacy and utility.
Ji et al. [45] introduced a theoretical model to quantify the de-anonymizablity of graph datasets
by considering the topological importance of nodes. They inferred that privacy is affected by high
average degree. Lee et al. [46] analyzed the relation between the utility of an anonymized graph
and its vulnerability to a common neighbor-based node re-identification attack. They formulate
conditions for the success of de-anonymization attacks based on two distance-based utility metrics
between the anonymized (or auxiliary) and the original graph.
The differences between the privacy vs. anonymity investigations and our focus are the
following: First, our question addresses the original graph properties rather than the anonymized
version. Thus, answers to this question are independent of any anonymization techniques, but
instead apply to the intrinsic properties of the original network. Second, by not focusing on utility
we are not restricted to selecting a subset of “useful” properties of the network for a particular
context, and thus our question allows for a wider investigation of graph properties and their effect.
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2.1.2 De-anonymization Attack Models and Success Metrics
A well accepted graph de-anonymization attack uses information from an auxiliary graph
in order to re-identify the nodes in an anonymized graph [47]. The success of such an attack
is determined by the rate of correct re-identification of the original nodes in the network. In
general, de-anonymization attacks harness structural characteristics of nodes that are uniquely
distinguishable [22]. Many such attacks can be categorized into seed-based and seed-free, based on
the prior seed knowledge available to an attacker [22].
In seed-based attacks, the process of de-anonymization is conducted to re-identify nodes and
ties with the support of sybil nodes [48] or some known mappings of nodes in an auxiliary graph
[5, 6, 7, 49, 8]. The effectiveness of such attacks is influenced by the quality of the seeds [9].
In seed-free attacks, the problem of de-anonymization is usually modeled as a graph matching
problem [50] (also known as the network alignment problem [51]). On aligning networks, the goal
is to find the correct mapping between the node sets of two structurally correlated graphs. Recent
work suggests information-theoretic conditions when this perfect mapping is possible [52, 53, 51, 54].
Most of these studies are based on Erdös-Rènyi models (theoretical models without representation
in real datasets) and assume unlimited computational resources, while others make impractical
assumptions about the seed knowledge, such as the availability of hub nodes as seeds [55].
Several research efforts have proposed statistical models for the re-identification of nodes
without relying on seeds, such as the Bayesian model [50] or optimization models [56, 39]. Many
heuristics were taken into account for the propagation process of re-identification, exploiting graph
characteristics such as degree [57], k-hop neighborhood [58], linkage-covariance [38], eccentricity [47],
or community [59].
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Some anonymization techniques rely on perturbing a set of edges in the original graph
within the limits of a given privacy budget [22]. For example, differential privacy captures the
amount of noise injected [41], which is also a popular theoretical metric of quantifying the privacy
of an anonymized graph. However, differential privacy is highly sensitive to the privacy budget
which measures the maximum number of queries acceptable without leaking secrets [60]. Moreover,
privacy metrics based on differential privacy have been shown to over-estimate privacy gains [44].
Sharad [9] proposed a general threat model to measure the success of a de-anonymization
attack which is independent of the anonymization scheme. He proposed a machine learning framework to benchmark perturbation-based graph anonymization schemes. This framework explores
the hidden invariants and similarities to re-identify nodes in the anonymized graphs [24]. Importantly, this framework can be easily tuned to model various types of attacks. We build on Sharad’s
approach in this study.

2.2

Modeling Privacy Based on Network Properties
Our main objective is to quantify the relationship between a graph’s structural properties

and the risk to the privacy of its nodes. We call node privacy the ability to keep the identity
of a node protected. Intuitively, in a regular graph—where all nodes have the same number of
neighbors—nodes are private: it is impossible, based on topological information only, to distinguish
a node from the others. At the other end of the spectrum, the core of a star topology is easy to
identify with some extra information. Real graph datasets lay in between these examples.
A node’s identity may be protected via naive sanitization, by simply removing the identifiable
attributes of the node, or by structural anonymization, in which nodes and edges in the graph are
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removed/inserted to obscure the original topological structure. In this work we do not need to
differentiate between these two scenarios, as the question we ask attempts to relate the properties
of a graph—whether original or structurally perturbed—and the privacy of its nodes. Specifically,
we ask: Given a graph topology, which of its structural properties reveal most information that can
be used to identify its nodes? Note that if the graph of interest is the original topology of a network,
then the question relates to the intrinsic vulnerability of a dataset to a re-identification attack.
If the graph is already perturbed, then the question refers to the vulnerability of the structurally
anonymized network to a de-anonymization attack. In this chapter, we use re-identification and
de-anonymization attacks interchangeably.

2.2.1 Framework
To answer this question, we developed a framework as shown in Figure 2.1. The framework
takes as input a graph dataset and contains three main components. One component, called the
Attack Model in the figure, implements a re-identification attack on the input dataset and outputs a
vulnerability score. Any attack algorithm can be plugged in to this component. For experimentation,
we implemented a machine-learning algorithm (described in Section 2.2.2.2) based on an accepted
threat model [52] (presented in Section 2.2.2.1). The definition of the vulnerability score depends
on the attack model implemented.
The second component of this framework, called “Network Analysis” in the figure, performs
traditional network measurements. Any metrics of interest can be output from this component
in the form of numerical values or distributions. Since there are many well established tools for
network analysis in the form of libraries implemented in Python, R, C++, etc., we do not need to
provide any more details here.
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Figure 2.1: Framework to measure privacy and utility. We analyze the relationship between graph
vulnerability and graph properties.
Finally, the network metrics of interest and the vulnerability score of the original graph are
the input of the third component, the Causality Analyzer. This component performs a rigorous
analysis of the relationship between graph vulnerability and its structural properties. The output
from this component is providing a statistical answer to the question of interest.

2.2.2 The Attack Model
In order to quantify the vulnerability of a graph to node re-identification attacks, we employ
a machine learning-based approach that aims at finding a bijective mapping between nodes in two
different but overlapping graphs.

2.2.2.1

The Threat Model
We consider the classical threat model [52] in which the attacker aims to match nodes from

two networks whose edge sets are correlated. A real-life scenario corresponding to this threat model
is as follows. Let us assume there is a privacy breach over the Unix accounts of some students in a
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Computer Science department: the accounts of those who accessed Facebook and Twitter from the
university network are thus compromised. Consequently, an attacker has a partial view of possibly
overlapping Facebook and Twitter subgraphs: some individuals are present in both graphs, even if
their identities have been removed. The attacker’s task is to find a bijective mapping between the
two subsets of nodes in the two graphs that correspond to individuals present in both networks.
Formally, we assume that the adversary has a sanitized graph Gsan that could be associated
with an auxiliary graph Gaux for the re-identification attack. In the scenario discussed above, Gsan
is the Facebook network, while Gaux is the Twitter network of the students affected.
In order to model this scenario using real data, we split a real dataset graph G = (V, E)
into two subgraphs G1 = (V1 , E1 ) and G2 = (V2 , E2 ), such that V1 ⊂ V , V2 ⊂ V and V1 ∩ V2 = Vα ,
where Vα 6= φ. The fraction of the overlap α is measured by the Jaccard coefficient of two subsets:
α=

|V1 ∩V2 |
|V1 ∪V2 | .

In the shared subgraph induced by the nodes in Vα , nodes will preserve their edges

with nodes from Vα but might have different edges to nodes that are part of V1 − Vα or part of
V2 − Vα .
In an optimistic scenario, an attacker has access to a part of the original graph (e.g., G1 )
as auxiliary data and to an unperturbed subgraph (e.g., G2 ) as the sanitized data whose nodes
the attacker wants to re-identify. It is also possible to split G1 and G2 recursively into multiple
overlapping graphs, maintaining the same values of overlap parameters as above. This allows us to
assess the feasibility of the de-anonymization process for large networks by significantly reducing
the size of G1 and G2 .
The resulting graphs are now the equivalent of the Facebook and Twitter networks we
used as an example above. The overlap is the knowledge repository that the attacker uses for
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de-anonymization [61]. Part of this knowledge will be made available to the machine learning
algorithms.
Intuitively, the larger α, the more successful the attack. However, the relative success of
attacks under different anonymization schemes is observed to be independent of α [9]. In order to
experiment with various strengths of the attack for a fixed value of α = 0.2, we constructed Vα in
four different ways: i) as a random collection of nodes from the original graph G (R); ii) by selecting
the highest degree nodes from G (HD); iii) by building a breadth-first-search tree starting from a
randomly selected node in G (BFS-R); and iv) by building a breadth-first-search tree starting from
the highest degree node in G (BFS-HD).

2.2.2.2

The Attack Algorithm
As previously discussed, many de-anonymization attacks can be implemented in this frame-

work. We chose to implement the attack algorithm based on a machine learning approach for a
number of reasons. First, machine learning techniques have proven successful in many real life
instances of the context of graph de-anonymization [24]. Second, machine learning approaches
automatically discover recognizable patterns, and thus they implicitly cover many algorithmic approaches for node re-identification. Therefore, they mount a powerful attack that can be used as
benchmark for future studies.
Intuitively, a machine learning attack uses the information about the users in the two networks from the example scenario above to learn structural network patterns. It then uses these
patterns to match different nodes based on similar structural characteristics. Each node is represented for learning by a set of features, as explained below.
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We chose to use neighborhood degree distribution (NDD) to construct the feature vector for
each node. NDD is a popular representation method due to its robustness to noise in distinguishing
nodes in the graph [24, 62] and for its generality [61]. Degree-based features are also shown to
be better counterparts than common-neighbor features for the performance of percolation-based
de-anonymization algorithms [8].
NDD of a user u is a vector of positive integers where N DDuq [k] represents the number of
u’s neighbors at distance q with degree k. We concatenate the binned version of N DDu1 with the
binned version of N DDu2 to define the node u’s NDD signature. A distance q of 2 is sufficiently
revealing for social networks which are known for having a small average path length: larger values
of q will end up recording a large part of the graph which leads to high redundancy in training data.
We use a bin size of 50, which was shown empirically [9] to capture the high degree variations of
large social graphs. For each q, we use 21 bins, which would correspond to a larger node degree of
1050. All larger values are binned in to the last bin. This binning strategy is designed to capture
the aggregate structure of ego networks [43].
Note that the nodes in Gsan ∩ Gaux , common to both graphs, can be recognized as being
the same node (identical) in the two graphs based on their node identifier. Non-identical nodes are
unique to each Gsan and Gaux and do not exist in the overlap. We use a learning algorithm based
on an ensemble of random decision trees (i.e., Random Forest) to perform the classification task of
quantifying graph vulnerability [63]. The classification task outputs 1 for identical node pairs and
0 for non-identical node pairs. This is the ground truth against which we measure the accuracy
of the learning algorithms. We generate examples for the training phase of the de-anonymization
attack by randomly picking node pairs from the sanitized (Gsan ) and the auxiliary (Gaux ) graphs,
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respectively. Each training example represents a pair of nodes (each node being represented by its
NDD) and whether the nodes are identical or not.
In most cases, we have an unbalanced dataset with the degree of imbalance depending
on the overlap parameter α, where the majority is non-identical node pairs. We use the reservoir
sampling technique [64] to take `=1000 balance sub-samples from the population S, and the SMOTE
algorithm [65] as an over-sampling technique for each sub-sample. Each sample is trained by a forest
of =100 random decision trees. Each decision tree performs a binary classification to measure the
quality of the classifier on the task of differentiating two nodes as identical or not. We use both
bagging [66] and randomized node optimization [67] techniques to select a random subset of training
examples with a random subset of features for each learner to train and test respectively. Having
many decision tree learners enable us to mount multiple attacks in the same graph space. Therefore,
we devise ` × =100,000 attack scenarios per one input graph.
We measure the accuracy of the classifier in determining whether a randomly chosen pair
of nodes (with one node in Gsan and another in Gaux ) are identical. We use F1-score to evaluate
the quality of the classifier. F1-score is the harmonic mean between precision and recall, typical
metrics for prediction output of machine learning algorithms. For each data sample, we perform
5×2 cross-validation to evaluate the classifier and record the mean F1-score.
Intuitively, the strength of an attacker is not solely defined by the size of the subgraph to
which the attacker has access, but also by the "quality" of the subgraph [53]: for example, a disjoint
set of low degree nodes (which would be the case of a randomly chosen set of nodes from a power-law
graph) carries less structural information than a connected subgraph of the same number of nodes.
Figure 2.2 presents the performance of the node re-identification attack under different methods of
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building the overlap subgraph. We present these results here before we introduce the datasets for two
reasons. First, the results are consistent across all datasets tested, and they support the intuition
presented above. Therefore, the characteristics of the datasets are irrelevant for understanding
these particular experimental results. Second, we only present these results to justify our choice
for building the overlap subgraph in the rest of the experiments. To maintain the reading flow, we
present all design details in this section.
Figure 2.2 confirms multiple intuitions. First, the attack is consistently and significantly
stronger when the nodes in the overlap are connected (scenarios marked with BFS in the plot).
Second, the attack is stronger when the density of the overlap is higher.
In the rest of our study, we use BFS-HD to generate the overlap. In addition to being a
stronger attack because of starting from a richer knowledge set, our attack mechanism based on
BFS-HD turns out to be representative for percolation-based network alignment methods [51] proposed in other contexts, such as protein-protein interaction networks. Also, many de-anonymization
attacks [47, 68, 8] employ similar techniques based on the percolation theory. Our machine-learning
based attack is thus a generalization of existing de-anonymization attacks that have the same core
ingredients: start from a set of already identified nodes and successively identify their neighbors.
The reason behind the success of ML-based de-anonymization techniques is that they learn automatically invariants useful for node re-identification. Thus, the same ML-based de-anonymization
attack can be used successfully against different anonymization techniques [9].
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R (d=0.0533, r=-0.084, C=0.148)
HD (d=0.0542, r=-0.081, C=0.155)
BFS-HD (d=0.0978, r=-0.145, C=0.302)
BFS-R (d=0.069, r=-0.06, C=0.154)

(a) fb107: 1K
R (d=0.053, r=0.405, C=0.415)
HD (d=0.0533, r=0.408, C=0.425)
BFS-HD (d=0.0931, r=0.219, C=0.468)
BFS-R (d=0.072, r=0.204, C=0.393)

(c) fb107: 2K

R (d=0.053, r=0.418, C=0.453)
HD (d=0.0535, r=0.407, C=0.456)
BFS-HD (d=0.0934, r=0.221, C=0.469)
BFS-R (d=0.0698, r=0.255, C=0.465)

(e) fb107: 2.5K

R (d=0.0034, r=-0.015, C=0.013)
HD (d=0.0036, r=-0.015, C=0.014)
BFS-HD (d=0.0049, r=-0.072, C=0.03)
BFS-R (d=0.0049, r=-0.067, C=0.032)

(b) caGrQc: 1K
R (d=0.0021, r=0.634, C=0.372)
HD (d=0.0022, r=0.637, C=0.429)
BFS-HD (d=0.0043, r=0.579, C=0.512)
BFS-R (d=0.0041, r=0.697, C=0.568)

(d) caGrQc: 2K

R (d=0.0022, r=0.661, C=0.507)
HD (d=0.0022, r=0.647, C=0.547)
BFS-HD (d=0.0043, r=0.588, C=0.564)
BFS-R (d=0.0043, r=0.701, C=0.607)

(f) caGrQc: 2.5K

Figure 2.2: A comparison of attack strength based on different overlap choices. The overlap choices
include Random (R), High Degree (HD) and BFS-trees (rooted in the highest degree node BFS-HD
and, respectively, a random node, BFS-R). Accuracy of predicting identical pairs is presented over
¯ assortativity (r), and transitivity (C) are
different dK spaces. Graph properties of density (d),
averaged over 8 subgraphs per dK-space that are associated with the given overlap.
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2.2.3 Causality Analyzer
The objective of the Causality Analyzer component is to reveal the effect of topological
metrics on graph vulnerability.
In our implementation, we chose to study the causality and associativity relationships [69].
In both cases, we start from the same set of metrics, vulnerability (as measured by the F1-score) and
a set of graph measurements obtained with classical social network analysis techniques, and apply
different tools to isolate the strength of the causality and the strength of associativity relationships.
As before, these tools can be replaced with different ones than we employed here.

2.2.3.1

Causality via Explanatory Modeling
We use explanatory modeling techniques [70] to measure the significance of the causal rela-

tionship between graph metrics and graph vulnerability.
We estimate the graph vulnerability function f through several regression tests, both linear
and entropy-based. Each model tests the individual effect of graph metrics on explaining the graph
vulnerability score. The target variable is the vulnerability score (i.e., F1-score), and independent
variables are the associated structural properties including macro-level graph metrics such as density,
assortativity, transitivity, average path length, and the proportion of degree-1 nodes in the given
network. We select these properties as an example for studying the importance of community
structure on the success of node re-identification attacks.
We use F-test [70] and Mutual Information (MI) to measure the causality in the relationship [71]. F-test captures the significance of any independent variables on the correlation with the
target variable using multiple linear regression models. MI is defined as a nonlinear function of
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the join probability measure between target variable and independent variables, which captures any
kind of dependency in the variable space. Both F-test and MI are in the range of 0 to 1, and the
higher values represent more significant dependencies.
In order to infer the causal relationship in the target and independent variable space, we use
the Pearlian framework [72] which produces a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) describing the causality. Specifically, we use the IC* (Inductive Causation) algorithm [72] in the Pearlian framework to
establish this causality. The core idea is to find whether variable X has a (direct) causal influence
on variable Y. This algorithm outputs a directed acyclic graph where each variable represents a
node, and the edge represents a statistical dependence between variables for causation. The IC*
algorithm recursively constructs this graph after performing probabilistic conditional independence
tests for all pairs and triplets of variables. Specially, the algorithm assumes the existence of hidden
confounding variables when deriving latent causal structure. This is important as we do not cover
the entire graph metric space in our analysis. We used an open-source Python implementation [73]
of the Pearlian framework to perform the causality inference.

2.2.3.2

Associativity via Predictive Modeling
As an attempt to uncover potential association between graph metrics and vulnerability,

we quantify the level of predictability of the vulnerability score using structural properties. We
construct the graph vulnerability function f from the examples of derived vulnerability scores associated with structural properties in the given graph. Note that we use the same set of structural
properties used in explanatory modeling. Our models assess the ability to generate predictions
of vulnerability score for a set of unseen graphs, when given only the structural metrics as graph
descriptions. On validating predictive models, we provide measurements related to the residuals
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and generalization of each model. We use cross-validation (i.e., holdout sets) techniques to avoid
over-optimistic performance of the prediction results.
We report three metrics to measure the regression performance. First, the Root Mean
Squared Error (RMSE), which corresponds to the expected value of squared loss in the same units
as the target variable. Second, Explained Variance (EVAR), which measures the significance of the
variance of the error with respect to the variance of the target variable. Finally, the R2 score (R2 S),
which measures the likelihood of predicting future examples correctly. RMSE ranges from 0 to ∞,
where lower values in the range of F1-score (0 ≤ F1-score ≤ 1) depict more accurate predictions.
EV AR and R2 S range from −∞ to 1, the higher the values, the more accurate the models.

2.3

Datasets
Our objective is to evaluate the framework we proposed for quantifying what structural

properties make graphs more vulnerable to de-anonymization attacks. To this end, we select a
number of real network datasets (presented in Section 2.3.1) and generate families of synthetic graphs
using three different approaches that control particular graph metrics (as presented in Section 2.3.2).
These synthetic graphs serve to capture both independent and inter-dependent structural forces in
the network.

2.3.1 Real World Networks
We chose four publicly available datasets that represent real social networks of various types.
fb107 [74] represents social circles of an ego in Facebook. caGrQc [75] is a co-authorship network
between the authors of papers in general relativity and quantum cosmology. soc-anybeat [76] is an
interaction network available in the Anybeat online community, which is a public gathering place
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across the world. Finally, soc-gplus [77] is a follower network from Google+. Table 2.1 summarizes
the properties of these datasets.

2.3.2 Synthetic Networks
In order to be able to control graph characteristics, we also generated families of synthetic
graphs with the subsets of the characteristics of the real datasets. We used three graph generation
techniques that individually cover different spaces of graph metrics.
dK-Random graphs model topological constraints systematically with respect to the node
degree. They are known to be less random and more structured the higher the d (presented in
Section 2.3.2.1). While degree distributions have been shown to capture very important graph
properties [78], they typically fail to reproduce some others, such as the clustering coefficient. In
order to analyze graphs with controlled clustering coefficient (that is, similar to those of the real
networks studied), we employ the second graph generation technique: The Exponential Random
Graph Model (ERGM) is a mature modeling framework that maximizes the likelihood of generating
a random graph with given properties (presented in Section 2.3.2.2).
While widely used especially in Sociology, in our experience ERGMs fail to generate graphs
with the desired range of degree assortativity coefficient. In order to vary this structural characteristic and cover the corresponding graph space, we used another technique specifically designed
to generate graphs with a good range of local and global assortativity coefficients, a model that we
name the Leader-Follower (LF) model and present in Section 2.3.2.3.
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2.3.2.1

dK-Random
The dK-series represents a set of descriptive statistic metrics that capture the original graph

structure at multiple levels of detail [79, 41]. Specifically, the dK-series summarizes the structure
of a graph from the degree distribution of a subgraph pattern of size d. Thus, 0K-graphs are
random graphs with a given average node degree, 1K-graphs are random graphs with a given degree
distribution, 2K-graphs are random graphs with a given joint degree distribution, 3K-graphs are
random graphs with a given interconnectivity of triplets of nodes, and so on. Intermediate steps
in the series can be defined, such as the 2.5K graph, which is a relaxed version of 3K-graphs
that reproduces both joint degree distribution and degree-dependent clustering coefficient [80]. We
used RandNetGen [78] to generate 0K, 1K, and 2K graphs. (In this work we have not used
2.5 graph generators, as controlling the clustering coefficient independently from the joint degree
distribution better fits our objectives). No graph generative algorithms are known for steps higher
in the series [78].

2.3.2.2

ERGM
Exponential-family random graph models (ERGMs) or p-star models [81, 82] are used in

social network analysis for stipulating, within a set structural parameters, distribution probabilities for networks. Its primary use is to describe structural and local forces that shape the general
topology of a network. This is achieved by using a selected set of parameters that encompass different structural forces (e.g., homophily, degree correlation/assortativity, clustering, and average path
length). Once the model has converged, we can obtain maximum-likelihood estimates, model comparison and goodness-of-fit tests, and generate simulated networks tied to the relationship between
the original network and the probability distribution provided by the ERGM.
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Our interest in ERGMs is based on simulating graphs that retain set structural information
from the original graph to generate a diverse set of graph structures. We used R [83] and the statnet
suite [84], which contains several packages for network analysis, to produce ERGMs and simulate
graphs from our real-world network datasets. In this case, we focused on three structural aspects
of the graphs: clustering coefficient, average path length, and degree correlation/assortativity. For
the ERGM based on clustering coefficient (ERGM-cc), we used the edges and triangle parameters
in the statnet package. The edges parameter measures the probability of linkage or no linkage
between nodes, and the triangle term looks at the number of triangles or triad formations in the
original graph. For the average path length model (ERGM-apl ), edges and twopath terms were
used. The twopath term measures the number of 2-paths in the original network and produces a
probability distribution of their formation for the converged ERGM. Lastly, for the assortativity
measure (ERGM-dc), the terms edges and degcor were used to produce the models. The degcor
term considers the degree correlation of all pairs of tied nodes (for more on ERGMs see [85, 86]).
These terms proved to be our best choices for preserving, to a certain extent, the desired structural
information. Although the creation of ERGMs is a trial and error process, the selected terms were
successful in producing models for each of the original networks.

2.3.2.3

Leader-Follower
We use Leader-Follower (LF) model [87] to generate networks with controlled degree-based

assortativity coefficients. This model controls two node populations in which one group (i.e., followers) selects edges randomly to connect such that the preferential attachment behavior emerges
spontaneously, while other group (i.e., leaders) adopts an anti-preferential behavior which creates
ties to lower-degree nodes. The generation algorithm requires three parameters: p is the fraction
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Figure 2.3: Transitivity (C) and assortativity (r) on LF graphs. Multiple regression models are
presented as a function of m, where dashed, dotted and dash-dotted lines represent models for
m = 2, 5, and 10, in this order.
of leader nodes, m is the maximum number of connections possible for a node to initiate, and l
defines the extent of neighborhood information available for a node to decide initial connections.
For simplicity, we set l = 1, such that a new node decides its choices to connect from an immediate
neighborhood around an anchor node.
When there are no leader nodes (p = 0), the generated networks exhibit strong preferential
attachment behavior, leading to a negative degree-assortativity value. When p = 1, the resulting
graphs have positive degree assortativity. Experimentally, p was confirmed to be proportional to
degree assortativity, as shown in Figure 2.3 for two of the real datasets we analyzed. Note also the
linear relationship between transitivity and degree assortativity in this plot.
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Table 2.1: Graph properties of the real and synthetic network datasets. All graphs are undirected.
¯ is the fraction of all possible edges. Degree-assortativity (r) measures the similarity of
Density (d)
relations depending on the associated node degree. Transitivity (C) is the fraction of triangles of all
possible triangles in the network. Average path length (κ) depicts the average shortest path length
between any pairs of nodes and degree-1 represents the percentage of nodes in the network with
degree exactly 1. Average values are presented over 100 synthetic graphs per space.
Network

fb107

caGrQc

soc-anybeat

soc-gplus

space
original
0K
1K
2K
ERGM-apl
ERGM-cc
ERGM-dc
LF (m=2)
LF (m=5)
LF (m=10)
original
0K
1K
2K
ERGM-apl
ERGM-cc
ERGM-dc
LF (m=2)
LF (m=5)
LF (m=10)
original
0K
1K
2K
ERGM-apl
ERGM-cc
ERGM-dc
original
0K
1K
2K
ERGM-apl
ERGM-cc
ERGM-dc

|N |
1034
1034
1034
1034
1034
1034
1034
1034
1034
1034
5242
5242
5241
5241
5241
4507
5237
5242
5242
5242
12645
12645
12645
12645
12635
12582
12459
23628
23628
23628
23628
22544
17784
22042

|E|
26749
26749
26749
26749
26749
26749
26749
2066
5165
10330
14496
14496
14484
14484
14484
14484
14484
10482
26205
52410
49132
49132
49132
49132
49132
49132
49132
39194
39194
39194
39194
39194
39194
39194

d¯
0.0500
0.0501
0.0501
0.0501
0.0501
0.0501
0.0501
0.0039
0.0097
0.0193
0.0011
0.0011
0.0011
0.0011
0.0011
0.0014
0.0011
0.0008
0.0019
0.0038
0.0006
0.0006
0.0006
0.0006
0.0006
0.0006
0.0006
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0001
0.0002
0.0001

r
0.4316
-0.0029
-0.0961
0.4316
0.0017
0.4293
0.3747
0.1425
0.2308
0.2733
0.6592
-0.0011
-0.0355
0.6593
0.0390
0.6804
0.4547
0.1536
0.24
0.2771
-0.1234
-0.0001
-0.1232
-0.1234
-0.0572
0.2285
-0.0831
-0.3885
0.0009
-0.3514
-0.3885
-0.0729
-0.0651
-0.2407

C
0.5045
0.0501
0.1466
0.3161
0.0504
0.5038
0.1627
0.2173
0.2463
0.2164
0.6298
0.0010
0.0077
0.2710
0.0064
0.6278
0.0790
0.2132
0.2348
0.1895
0.0217
0.0006
0.0149
0.0176
0.0018
0.1877
0.0158
0.0037
0.0001
0.0137
0.0018
0.0004
0.0337
0.0024

κ
2.9517
2.0210
2.1965
2.4020
2.0193
2.8796
2.1197
10.2155
5.5336
3.6806
3.8047
5.2155
4.0002
1.0410
5.4390
5.6361
5.5294
13.0612
7.1527
4.7513
3.1715
4.8365
2.8779
2.4943
3.2206
4.9853
3.3204
2.2082
7.7045
3.1760
3.8620
4.5236
5.8122
4.0795

degree-1 (%)
1.45
0.0
1.45
1.45
0.0
0.57
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
22.83
2.22
22.83
22.83
0.02
10.43
0.98
0.0
0.0
0.0
49.51
0.33
49.50
49.50
0.61
2.57
8.93
69.16
12.46
69.16
69.16
15.32
39.76
30.52
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2.4

Empirical Results
Our objectives for empirical evaluations are twofold. On one hand, we aim at evaluating

the utility of the framework we proposed. On the other hand, we use the framework to answer
the question: What structural properties makes some graph datasets more vulnerable to attacks than
others?
We start by evaluating the vulnerability of the real and synthetic graphs in our collection.
We quantify the vulnerability of a graph as a function of the rate of successful node re-identification,
and present a comparison of vulnerability scores across different families of graphs (as presented in
Section 2.4.1). Furthermore, we perform a rigorous analysis on the relationship between graph vulnerability and different structural forces to identify the factors that contribute towards a successful
de-anonymization attack. We present both information-theoretic (as presented in Section 2.4.2) and
performance (as presented in Section 2.4.3) measurements to evaluate this relationship.

2.4.1 Graph Vulnerability Analysis
We report the F1-score as the accuracy of predicting the structural equivalence of a pair
of nodes, which we refer to as graph vulnerability score. Figure 2.4 presents a comparison of
vulnerability scores for different synthetic graph spaces. We observe three phenomena.
The first observation is related to the comparison of vulnerability scores in ERGM spaces.
The mean vulnerability score increases in the order of ERGM-apl, ERGM-dc and ERGM-cc, while
ERGM-apl shows the widest range. What this seems to suggest is that preserving assortativity and
transitivity as utility metrics in an anonymization technique can potentially damage the anonymity
of the nodes in the graph. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to observe this phenomenon.
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Figure 2.4: A comparison of the F1-score over different graph input spaces. Each score represents
prediction results of 5 × 2 cross-validation samples, which is averaged over 100 synthetic graphs per
space.
To better understand the effect of degree assortativity, we focus on LF-generated graphs,
where assortativity is varied. Figure 2.5 presents a comparison of graph vulnerability scores as
a function of the LF graph generator parameters, p and m, as presented in Section 2.3.2.3. The
vulnerability score reaches a local maximum for small p and drop to local minima when p is in the
range of 0.4−0.6. Since p is proportional to assortativity, which in turn is proportional to transitivity
for the given LF graphs (Figure 2.3), it is highly likely that assortativity and transitivity are factors
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of graph vulnerability. We perform a rigorous statistical analysis in the next section to understand
how assortativity and transitivity affect the graph’s vulnerability to de-anonymization attacks.
Second, as Figures 2.4a–2.4d show, some of ERGM-generated graphs are more vulnerable
than 1K or even 2K graphs despite the fact that they do not replicate the original graph distribution. From previous results, the intuition was that privacy increases with the perturbation of the
degree distribution [41]. Our results show that a different graph metric—in this case transitivity—is
even more revealing than the degree distribution. Specifically, in the soc-anybeat network, the vulnerability of the ERGM-cc generated graphs is higher on average than the average vulnerability of
the 1K and 2K graphs (Figure 2.4c). This is happening despite the fact that the ERGM-cc graphs
have a very different degree distribution, as seen in the last column of Table 3.1: while the original
graph (and thus the degree-preserving 1K and 2K graphs) had 49.5% of nodes with degree 1, the
ERGM-cc has only 2.57% such nodes. This result shows that there are structural properties that
make a graph more vulnerable to re-identification attacks than the degree distribution does. While
previous work [41] showed that disturbing the degree distribution is necessary for anonymity, we
show that it not sufficient: other graph metrics must also be perturbed to achieve anonymity.
Third, some known phenomena are confirmed by our experiments. The original graph
(denoted as GS) is more vulnerable in all cases, except for the soc-anybeat network (Figure 2.4c).
We discuss the reason behind this divergence later. At the other end of the spectrum, 0K (or
Erdös-Rènyi) graphs are (as expected) the least vulnerable, but also the least representative of real
datasets. In addition, the vulnerability scores of 1K and 2K graphs are the closest to the original.
This confirms already known results that show that dK graphs lack real expectations of privacy,
since higher dK graphs leak significant graph structural information [88, 41].
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Figure 2.5: A comparison of the F1-score over LF graphs. We generated a number of LF graphs
by varying parameters p and m. p is the probability that the network exhibits a force towards
anti-preferential attachment, which is positively correlated with degree-assortativity(r), while m
¯ of the network. Each score represents prediction results of 5 × 2
is proportional to density(d)
cross-validation samples, which is averaged over 10 synthetic graphs under the parameters of p and
m.
2.4.2 Causality Analysis Based on Explanatory Modeling
While Figures 2.4 and 2.5 show high variation in vulnerability with different topological
constraints, it is impossible to visually conclude what makes a graph more vulnerable. We study
the dependencies between the graph vulnerability score and a set of macro-level structural graph
properties to identify such patterns. One such pattern, in fact a causal explanation for graph
vulnerability, is presented in Figure 2.7 using explanatory modeling techniques. Two metrics of
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importance are used: F-test and mutual information (MI), as described in Section 2.2.3.1. In
the dK and ERGM spaces (as shown in Figures 2.7a and 2.7b), assortativity shows a relatively
low F-test value, suggesting a weak linear dependency with the vulnerability score. Meanwhile, it
shows significantly higher MI value, which suggests a better reduction of uncertainty on explaining
the vulnerability score. Transitivity also appears more non-linearly dependent in the dK space,
since MI is relatively higher. The average shortest path length has mixed results in F-test, but
MI reaches maximum for both spaces. The proportion of degree-1 nodes is shown to be a strong
candidate of dependency with graph vulnerability. It shows higher values for both F-test and MI.
This somewhat explains the position of the original soc-anybeat network (GS) with respect to the
vulnerability score in Figure 2.4c. Comparing with generated ERGM graphs, soc-anybeat original
graph has 49.5% degree-1 nodes who are structurally indistinguishable. However, degree-1 nodes
also reveal less information about their neighbors’ positions in the network.
Figure 2.7c presents the dependency analysis of LF graphs. Similar to dK and ERGM graph
spaces, assortativity and transitivity show relatively higher MI values, and average shortest path
length reaches the maximum MI. It appears that transitivity is a linear function of vulnerability (Ftest=1). In fact, when we control for assortativity, transitivity is found to be positively correlated
with assortativity in LF graphs (Figure 2.3). Since transitivity is linear with vulnerability and
assortativity is linear with transitivity, we would expect assortativity to linearly cause vulnerability.
However, this is not the case, as shown by F-test=0.53 in the second plot of Figure 2.7c.
Figure 2.6 shows the pictorial view of the Pearlian Directed Acyclic Graph (as presented
in Section 2.2.3.1) which describes the causal pathways from one graph metric to another, or to
the graph vulnerability score derived from our experimental data. We do not specify any prior
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assumption about the causality in the Pearlian framework, but let the IC* algorithm to decide the
optimal causal pathways based on probabilistic conditional independence tests. In Pearlian Directed
Acyclic Graph, bidirected edges represent indirect casual relationships due to unobserved variables.
We observe two phenomena: First, transitivity, density, average path length and the fraction
of degree-1 nodes have a direct statistical dependency with the graph vulnerability score. However,
such dependencies are not identified as genuine causal relationships by the Pearlian framework.
This set of dependencies could be due to a set of other (unobserved) confounding graph metrics.
In our setting, a confounding metric presents an alternative explanation for the observed statistical
dependency between a graph vulnerability and the associated graph metrics. While average path
length has an immediate confounding effect on the causal pathway between transitivity and graph
vulnerability, the fraction of degree-1 nodes and assortativity have shown a combined confounding
effect for the same causal pathway.
Second, assortativity does not have a direct statistical dependency with the graph vulnerability score, but has confounded other graph metrics (i.e., transitivity, density and the fraction
of degree-1 nodes) to cause an effect on graph vulnerability. In general, this confounding effect
from assortativity is well captured by transitivity, and it transforms to cause an effect on graph
vulnerability.
In conclusion, vulnerability can be explained as a linear function of the fraction of degree-1
nodes, and a non-linear function of other graph metrics. Non-linearity of the relationship between
transitivity, assortativity, and graph vulnerability score is being significantly highlighted by the
explanatory modeling techniques we used. In the next section we further analyze this relationship
over the predictive capability of graph metrics.
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Figure 2.6: Pearlian directed acyclic graph. We use the Pearlian framework [72] for the causal
inference over the graph metrics and graph vulnerability score. The edge direction represents the
cause-effect relationship, where the arrow head points to the effect. The "*" notation on the edge
indicates the belief of the causal inference algorithm about the genuine causal relationships.
2.4.3 Performance Analysis Based on Predictive Modeling
So far, we analyzed the relationship between graph vulnerability score and associated graph
metrics without making any assumptions of a prediction model. Though such analysis reveals
important insights, the observations could not be generalized for any collection of networks. Our
framework supports another set of measurements based on predictive modeling. We fit the examples
into multiple regression models, and report the accuracy on predicting the vulnerability score for an
unseen set of graphs. The target variable is the F1-score, and the feature space includes the same
set of structural properties that we studied earlier. Section 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2 report the accuracy
for linear and polynomial regression models, respectively.
We prepare holdout sets of examples in two ways. First, we split data based on graph spaces,
and create three folds of data: dK, ERGM and LF. Then we perform 3-fold cross validation, and
report the performance of predictions. As an example, we train on dK space examples and test on
ERGM space examples.
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Figure 2.7: A comparison between F-test and mutual information measures. We calculate F-test
and mutual information between the vulnerability of a graph and associated structural properties
across different graph input spaces.
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Table 2.2: A comparison of the accuracy of predicting F1-score. We use linear regression model
to predict F1-score on different cross-validation graph spaces using structural properties including
density, assortativity, transitivity, average shortest path length and the percentage of degree-1 nodes.
Training
Synthetic
Synthetic
dK
dK
dK
ERGM
ERGM
ERGM

Testing
Original
Synthetic
dK
ERGM
LF
ERGM
dK
LF

RMSE
6.3156
0.0821
0.0533
0.0753
0.0392
0.1372
0.0646
0.0297

EVAR
-0.0020
0.0578
0.2162
-0.1867
-0.2170
-1.4304
0.4552
-2.7625

R2 S
-2.3627
-3.9392
-4.5240
-0.1994
-0.4052
-48.9614
0.3288
-2.9118

Second, we split data based on the families of original graphs for the predictions in the same
graph space, such that we create five folds of data, one for each family of original datasets. Then
we perform 5-fold cross validation, and report metrics on average. For example, one instance of
cross-validation includes training on examples from dK graphs generated from four networks, and
tests on examples from dK graphs generated from the fifth network. We repeat the same process
for ERGM graphs as well as all synthetic graphs.

2.4.3.1

Linear Regression Model
Table 2.2 presents the residuals and the coefficients of determination for the predictions

across different cross-validation sets of data. We make three observations.
First, when traning and testing take place within the same space (i.e., train on the synthetic
spaces defined by four original datasets and test on the synthetic graph space of the fifth dataset),
the dK space enables better accuracy than the ERGM space. Moreover, the dK space enables better
accuracy than when training is done on all synthetic spaces. What this means is that the dK space
is more vulnerable to re-identification attacks than any of the other spaces. For example, the RMSE
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Figure 2.8: The performance metrics over the degree of polynomial features. We generate polynomial
and interaction features from original feature space describing graph structural properties, such
that the new feature space includes all polynomial combinations of features under the specified
polynomial degree. Performance metrics are based on the associated polynomial regression model.
value for cross-validation in the dK space (0.05) is lower than in the ERGM space (0.13). Also the
variation of the predicted vulnerability score is better explained from the features in dK than ERGM
space regression model, where EV ARdK−dK = 0.21 > 0 and R2 SdK−dK > R2 SERGM −ERGM . Note
that the set of subscripts represents the training and testing set in the consecutive order.
Second, training on dK spaces and testing on ERGM spaces performs poorly compared with
the case where the training is done on the ERGM space and the testing on the dK space, where
EV ARERGM −dK > EV ARdK−ERGM and R2 SERGM −dK > R2 SdK−ERGM (see Table 2.2). This
suggests that the ERGM space is a richer training dataset than the dK space, which means that the
synthetic graphs in this space have more variation in the graph metric values and vulnerability. In
other words, the dK space constrains more drastically the values of the graph features considered,
and thus limits the learning. This behavior is the result of the dK space definition, but may also
be the outcome of the particular dK random graph generator we used.
And third, dK is a better training set for testing on LF than the ERGM space is. This
is likely explained by the fact that the LF and the dK spaces are closer to each other than they
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are to the ERGM space. Specifically, the degree assortativity (which controls the LF space) is
an aggregate measure of the joint degree distribution that defined the dK space. Moreover, the
LF space is generated only by two datasets, both with high assortativity and clustering. The
good predictability from training on the dK space confirms again the effect that assortativity and
clustering have on graph vulnerability.

2.4.3.2

Polynomial Regression Model
In our discussion so far, we outlined the linearity of structural properties with respect to the

given vulnerability. In general, our observations suggest there is a non-linear relationship with the
target and independent variables. We try to account for such a relationship through a polynomial
regression model. First, we transform the features (i.e., structural properties) to a new polynomial
feature space. This new space includes all polynomial combinations of raw structural property
values, and all interaction terms. Figure 2.8 presents the predictive power using two metrics of
interest: EVAR and R2 S (explained in Section 2.4.3), specifically to understand the variance of
graph vulnerability scores through the set of structural properties. We compare several regression
models in three polynomial feature spaces, under linear, quadratic, and quartic polynomial degrees.
Linear space is similar to the results we presented earlier in Section 2.4.3.1.
We make a number of observations. In the Synthetic training model, R2 S increases significantly in the quadratic polynomial space (Figure 2.8a). EVAR also reaches the local maximum in
this polynomial degree space. (Note that our synthetic space includes both dK and ERGM generated graphs, and average values are calculated over different cross-validation tests.) This proves the
existence of a combination effect of structural forces on explaining graph vulnerability.
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For a finer view of the graph vulnerability based on different synthetic spaces, we present
two local analyses: one related to the dK training model (Figure 2.8b) and the other related to
the ERGM training model (Figure 2.8c). In both training models, the variation of the target
variable (vulnerability) is better captured when increasing the degree of polynomial features (since
both EVAR and R2 S increase). However, we observe a special case in ERGM training model (as
presented in Figure 2.8c). The predictive power of the linear model is weakened after the addition
of interactive terms in quadratic space, which does not happen in the dK training model. In a sense,
we relax the utility conserved in ERGMs by transforming to a different feature space, thus having
relatively worst predictive model.

2.5

Summary and Discussions
This chapter poses and answers a new research question: What graph properties make net-

work datasets more vulnerable to node re-identification attacks? Unlike previous related research,
we question the intrinsic vulnerability of an original graph dataset rather than any particular
anonymized version of the dataset. An answer to this question can be used both to asses the risk
of publishing an original dataset and also to guide the data practitioner in selecting anonymization
techniques that provide the appropriate tradeoff between utility and privacy.
We introduce and experiment with a framework that identifies the relationships between
graph vulnerability and graph properties. Our code is available for download at [42]. The components of this framework include i) a quantification of graph vulnerability as measured by the success
of a re-identification attack; ii) a quantification of the relationship between graph vulnerability and
a set of graph metrics. Moreover, we instantiated this framework with a strong attack model and
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a rigorous set of tools for causality analysis. Using thousands of synthetic graphs of controlled
properties we discovered a number of phenomena.
First, under the attack model considered, there is a strong statistical dependency between
the vulnerability score and transitivity and assortativity. That is to say, successful anonymization
techniques should not attempt to preserve the assortativity and transitivity of the original graph.
In other words, one could design an anonymization technique to explicitly perturb assortativity
and transitivity for increasing graph privacy. This observation opens a new door for designing
anonymization algorithms that has a chance against strong de-anonymization attacks.
Second, there is no linear relationship between the vulnerability score and the graph metrics
other than the fraction of degree-1 nodes in the network. One reason is that the most relevant
graph metrics in network analysis are interdependent [78]. Using a larger number of graph metrics
in the Pearlian causality model should help identify a more complex causal relationship between
graph vulnerability and properties.
Third, our comparison across graphs generated by different graph model generators lead
to an important conclusion. In an early work, Hay et al. [11] observe a graph’s density as a
determinant to describe the asymptotic limit of graph vulnerability. It was also well understood
that preserving the degree distribution or the degree correlation increases graph vulnerability [41]
and thus disturbing them is a necessary condition for graph anonymization. However, our study
shows that this condition is not sufficient: in some cases, other network properties independent
of the degree distribution put node privacy at risk. This is a disturbing result for the current
understanding of graph privacy, as it means that protecting graph privacy is much harder than
previously considered [10, 11].
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One concern is whether some of our observations depend on the tools we used to implement
the components of our framework. Specifically, we mounted a strong de-anonymization attack that
led to high vulnerability scores. One could argue that a different attack model or a different feature
representation for nodes (weaker than the NDD representation we used) could lead to different
vulnerability scores that might indicate a different relation between graph vulnerability and graph
metrics. We believe this is a valid concern and it highlights the usefulness of the framework we
propose. For example, one could use our framework to derive the causal relationship between the
parameters of an attack model and the rest of variable space including the graph vulnerability and
network properties. If node degree information is guaranteed not to be known to the attacker, then
our framework instantiated with a different attack model could identify different graph metrics that
expose node identities. If there are multiple attack models, our framework can be used to infer
more sophisticated causal relationships between the graph vulnerability and relevant graph metrics.
This feedback can also be used to compare the strengths of different attack models. We think this
is a promising future work direction to which our framework can contribute significantly. However,
we empirically proved that for such an attack, assortativity and transitivity are revealing much
information about node identities. Finally, this study could be extended to understand the intrinsic
vulnerability of dynamic graphs, or graphs with node and edge attributes.
Our framework fills a gap between theoretical research and practice, and provides a unifying platform for the development of new methodologies related to graph anonymization, deanonymization and graph vulnerability quantification. Specifically, this framework can be used
to select the particular tradeoff between acceptable vulnerability and needed utility in terms of
graph metrics. Data owners should carefully design anonymization algorithms given the require-
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ment of privacy and utility with respect to the quantified tradeoff identified by our framework.
They would re-evaluate or re-design the anonymization algorithm with such feedback. Alternatively, this framework can be used to empirically calibrate theoretical estimations of privacy, such
as techniques based on differential privacy. In a different context, this framework could be used to
inform a network alignment problem about the possible conditions for a perfect matching.
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Chapter 3: Privacy of Labeled Networks2

As shown in the previous chapter, we identify which structural properties contribute most
to graph vulnerability. However, in practice, most networks have node attributes such as labels
that identify nodes as cheaters or noncheaters in online gaming platforms [89]. The effects of node
attributes on the risks of node re-identifications are not yet well understood. While intuitively any
extra piece of information can be a danger to privacy, a rigorous understanding of what topological
and attribute properties affect the re-identification risks is needed. In cases such as information
dissemination, node attributes may be informed by the local graph topology. How does the interplay
between topology and node attributes affect node privacy?
This chapter assesses the additional vulnerability to re-identification attacks posed by the attributes of a labeled graph. We consider exactly one binary attribute to understand the lower bound
of the damage that node attributes inflict. We focus our empirical study on the interplay between
topology and labeling as a leverage point for re-identification. While most efforts for re-identification
attacks are meant to show the vulnerability or resilience of a particular anonymization technique,
this work is different, as it focuses on understanding in which conditions node re-identification is feasible, given the network topology and node attributes. Consequently, whether the network topology
is original or anonymized is irrelevant for our study. We extend the privacy framework as introduced
in the previous chapter for both topological and attribute information to re-identify nodes. Our
study involves real-world graphs and synthetic graphs in which we control how labels are placed
2

This chapter was previously published in [31, 32]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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relative to ties to mimic the ubiquitous phenomena of homophily—the tendency to connect with
similar people—found in social graphs [90].
Our empirical results show that the vulnerability to node re-identification depends on the
population diversity with respect to the attributes considered [31]. Using information about the
distribution of labels in a node’s neighborhood provides additional leverage for the re-identification
process, even when labels are rudimentary. In this study, we show more evidence on this phenomenon
based on the well-studied Susceptible-Infectious (SI) epidemic model. Furthermore, we quantify the
relative importance of attribute-related and topological features in graphs of different characteristics.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 outlines the related work.
The improved privacy framework is presented in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the characteristics
of the datasets we used in our empirical investigations. We present our results in Section 3.4 and
discuss our contributions in Section 3.5.

3.1

Related Work
Recently, there have been efforts to incorporate node attribute information into deanonymiza-

tion attacks. Gong et al. [91] evaluate the combination of structural and attribute information on
link prediction models. Attributes not present may be inferred through prior knowledge and network
homophily. Qian et al. [92] apply link prediction and attribute inference to deanonymization by
quantifying the prior background information of an attacker using knowledge graphs. In knowledge
graphs, edges not only represent links between nodes but also node-attribute links and link relationships among attributes. The deanonymization attack in [93] maps node-attribute links between
an anonymized graph and its auxiliary. In addition to structural similarity, nodes are matched by
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attribute difference, the union of the attributes of the node in the anonymized and auxiliary divided
by their intersection.
Several researchers propose theoretical frameworks to examine how vulnerable or deanonymizable any (anonymized) graph dataset is, given its structure [52, 56, 55, 45]. However, some techniques are based on unrealistic data models (e.g., Erdös-Rènyi (ER) models [52]), while others
make impractical assumptions about the seed knowledge [55]. Ji et al. [45] also introduced a configuration model to quantify the deanonymizablity of graph datasets by considering the topological
importance of nodes. The same set of authors analyzed the impact of attributes on graph data
anonymity [93]. They show a significant loss of anonymity when more node-attribute relations
are shared between anonymized and auxiliary graph data. Specifically, they measure the entropy
present in node-attribute mappings available for an attacker. As the entropy decreases, the graph
loses node anonymity.
The main aspects distinguishing this study from existing works are as follows: i) In our work,
we study the inherent conditions in graphs that provide resistance/vulnerability to a general node
re-identification attack based on machine learning techniques. ii) To the best of our knowledge, this
is the first work that quantifies the privacy impact of node attributes under an attribute attachment
model biased towards homophily. iii) We analyze the interplay between the intrinsic vulnerability
of the graph structure and attribute information.

3.2

Modeling Privacy Based on Network Properties and Node Labels
Our main objective is to quantitatively estimate the vulnerability to re-identification attacks

added by node attributes. In particular, we ask: Given a graph topology, how much better does a
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node re-identification attack perform when the node attributes are included in the attack compared
to when there is no node attribute information available to the attacker?
We are interested in measuring the intrinsic vulnerability of a graph with attributes on
nodes, in the absence of any particular anonymization technique on topology or node attributes.
The intuition is that particular graphs are inherently more private: for example, in a regular graph,
nodes are structurally indistinguishable. Adding attributes to nodes, however, may contribute extra
information that could make the re-identification attack more successful. Consider another example,
in a highly disassortative network (such as a sexual relationships network), knowing the attribute
values (i.e., gender) of a few nodes will quickly lead to correctly inferring the attribute values of the
majority of nodes, and thus possibly contributing to the re-identification of more nodes. Thus, we
also ask the following question in this study: How does the distribution of node attributes affect the
intrinsic vulnerability to a re-identification attack of a labeled graph topology?
To answer these question, we improved the machine learning-based re-identification attack
model from our previous work [30]. We use a similar threat model as before that aims at finding
a bijective mapping between nodes in two different labeled graphs (Section 3.2.1). We mount a
machine-learning based attack by employing additional node attribute features, in which the algorithm learns the correct mapping between some pairs of nodes from the two graphs, and estimates
the mapping of the rest of the dataset (Section 3.2.2).

3.2.1 The Attack Model
The threat model we consider is the classical threat model in this context [52]. The attacker
aims to match nodes from two networks whose edge sets are correlated. We assume each node
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is associated with a binary valued attribute, and this attribute is publicly available. Common
examples of such attributes are gender, professional level (i.e., junior or senior), or education level
(i.e., higher education or not).
For clarity, consider the following example: an attacker has access to two networks of individuals in an organization that represent the communication patterns (e.g., email) and friendship
information available from an online social network. Individuals in the communication network are
described by professional seniority (e.g., junior or senior), while individuals in the friendship network are described by gender. These graphs are structurally overlapping, in that some individuals
are present in both graphs, even if their identities have been removed. The attacker’s task is to
find a bijective (i.e., one-to-one) mapping between the two subsets of nodes in the two graphs that
correspond to the individuals present in both networks.
We assume that the adversary has a sanitized graph Gsan that could be associated with an
auxiliary graph Gaux for the re-identification attack (as depicted in Figure 3.1). As in the scenario
discussed above, Gsan could be the communication network, while Gaux is the friendship network
of a set of individuals in an organization. We use the same algorithm as presented in Section 2.2.2
to find the bijective mapping between Gsan and Gaux .

3.2.2 Topology and Node Labels
Since we are employing machine learning techniques to re-identify nodes in a graph, we
need to represent nodes as feature vectors. We define the node u’s features using a combination
of two vectors made up from its neighborhood degree distribution (NDD) (as explained in the
Section 2.2.2.2) and neighborhood attribute distribution (NAD) (as depicted in Figure 3.2).
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Figure 3.1: The overview of generating identical and non-identical node pairs. The nodes in the
overlap are identical to both Gaux and Gsan , but they have different structural characteristics.
NAD is defined by N ADuq [i] which represents the number of u’s neighbors at distance q with
an attribute value i. It was shown experimentally that the use of neighbor attributes as features
often improves the accuracy of edge classification tasks [94].
We use the notation GS to represent the prediction results from the input features made up
from the topology (e.g., NDD). GS(LBL) to represent features from both the topology and attribute
information (e.g., concatenation of NDD and NAD vectors).
Note that the nodes in Gsan ∩ Gaux , common to both graphs, can be recognized as being
the same node (identical) in the two graphs based on their node identifier. Non-identical nodes are
unique to each Gsan and Gaux and would not exist in the overlap. In the classification task, we wish
to output 1 for an identical node pair and 0 for a non-identical node pair. This is the ground truth
against which we measure the accuracy of the learning algorithms. We generate examples for the
training phase of the deanonymization attack by randomly picking node pairs from the sanitized
(Gsan ) and the auxiliary (Gaux ) graphs, respectively.
As described previously in Section 2.2.2, we train a classifier to differentiate two nodes as
identical or not. For each graph, we take ` = 1000 balanced sub-samples randomly and perform
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Figure 3.2: Example feature vector made up from NDD and NAD vectors. In the NAD vector, each
element corresponds to the number of nodes with the given attribute. Both 1-hop and 2-hop NADs
are calculated and merged. Node x has one 1-hop neighbor node, and two 2-hop neighbor nodes
with the attribute Red. Note that the node value represents the associated degree, and the border
color represents the node attribute Red or Blue.
5 × 2 cross-validation to evaluate the classifier using the mean F1-score. We thus build two vectors
of mean F1-scores, each of size ` = 1000, one for the labeled (GS(LBL)) and one for the unlabeled
network topology (GS). An important aspect of these vectors is that they are related in the sense
that the ith element in one vector represents the same sample as the ith element of the other vector.
This is important for the pairwise comparison of the two mean F1-score vectors.
We perform a standard T-test on these two vectors and report the T-statistic value. The
T-statistic value is a measure of how close to the hypothesis an estimated value is. In our case,
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the hypothesis is the prediction accuracy of the node identities in the unlabeled graph (GS) and
the estimated value is the prediction accuracy in the labeled graph (GS(LBL)). Thus, a large Tstatistic value implies a significantly better prediction accuracy of node identities in GS(LBL) than
in GS. In such cases, we can say that the network with node attributes is more vulnerable to node
re-identification. This value serves as our statistical measurement to quantify the vulnerability cost
of node attributes.

3.3

Datasets
Because our work is empirically driven, a larger set of test datasets promises a better un-

derstanding of the relations between vulnerability to re-identification attacks and the particular
characteristics of the node attributes (such as fractions of attributes of a particular value or the
assignment of attributes to topologically related nodes). In this respect, real datasets are always
preferable to synthetic ones, as they potentially encapsulate phenomena that are missing in the
graph generative models. As an example, until very recently, the relation between the local degree
assortativity coefficient and node degree was not captured in graph topology generators [87].
However, relying only on real datasets has its limitations, due to the scarcity of relevant data
(in this case, networks with binary node attributes) and the difficulty of covering the relevant space
of graph metrics when relying only on available real datasets. Thus, in this work, we combine real
networks (described in Section 3.3.1) with synthetic networks generated from the real datasets. For
generating synthetic labelled networks, we employ ERGMs [81, 82] and a controlled node-labeling
algorithm as described in Section 3.3.2.
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3.3.1 Real World Networks
We chose six publicly available datasets from four different contexts and generated eight
networks with binary node attributes.
• polblogs [95] is an interaction network between political blogs during the lead up to the 2004
US presidential election. This dataset includes ground-truth labels identifying each blog as
either conservative or liberal.
• fb-dartmouth, fb-michigan, and fb-caltech [96] are Facebook social networks extant at three
US universities in 2005. A number of node attributes such as dorm, gender, graduation year,
and academic major are available. We chose two such attributes that could be represented as
binary attributes: gender and occupation, whereby occupation we could identify the attribute
values “student” and “faculty”. From each dataset, we obtained two networks with the same
topology but different node attribute distributions.
• pokec-1 [97] is a sample of an online social network in Slovakia. While the Facebook samples are university networks, Pokec is a general social platform whose membership comprises
30% of the Slovakian population. pokec-1 is a one-fortieth sample. This dataset has gender
information available as a node attribute.
• amazon-products [98] is a bi-modal projection of categories in an Amazon product co-purchase
network. Nodes are labeled as “book” or “music”, edges signify that the two items were
purchased together.
As Table 3.1 shows, the networks generated from these datasets have different graph characteristics. For example, the density (d) of the graphs varies across three orders of magnitude,
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Table 3.1: Graph properties of the real network datasets. All graphs are undirected, and nodes are
annotated with a binary valued attribute. E.g., nodes in the polblogs network have the attribute
party with values; conservative and liberal. For simplicity, binary values are presented using the
notation of R and B, together with the distributions of such values over nodes and edges. p and τ
¯ is the fraction of all
present the estimated parameter values of the attraction model. Density (d)
possible edges, transitivity (C) is the fraction of triangles of all possible triangles in the network.
degree-assortativity (r) measures the similarity of relations depending on the associated node degree.
Average path length (κ) depicts the average shortest path length between any pairs of nodes.
Network
polblogs
(party)

Number of nodes
R(%)
B(%)
1224
48
52

fb-caltech
(gender)
(occupation)

91.5
72

fb-dartmouth
(gender)
(occupation)

86.5
62

fb-michigan
(gender)
(occupation)

92.2
77.5

Number of edges
R − R(%) B − B(%) R − B(%)
16718
44
48
8

769

p

τ

0.48

0.84

d¯

C

r

κ

0.02

0.22

−0.22

2.49

8.5
28

92.8
69

16656
0.2
8

7
23

0.08
0.28

0.52
0.42

0.05

0.29

−0.06

1.33

13.5
38

83.2
58

304076
0.9
18

15.9
24

0.14
0.38

0.34
0.5

0.01

0.15

0.04

2.76

7.8
22.5

90.5
72

1176516
0.2
9

9.3
19

0.08
0.22

0.37
0.46

0.0026

0.13

0.115

3.05

0.46

0

2 × 10−5

0.0068

−0.044

5.66

0.18

0.99

1.8 × 10−5

0.21

−0.06

17.42

7694

30147

pokec-1
(gender)

265388
46

54

18.6

700352
22.4
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amazon-products
(category)

303551
82

18

83.4

835326
16.4

0.2

while degree assortativity oscillates between disassortative (for polblogs, r = −0.22, where there are
more interactions between popular and obscure blogs than expected by chance) to assortative (as
expected for social networks). All topologies except for amazon-products have small average path
length.
This wide variation in graph metrics values is what motivated our choice for these set of real
networks. We opted to include the three Facebook networks from similar contexts to also capture
more subtle variations in network characteristics.
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3.3.2 Synthetic Networks
In order to be able to control graph characteristics and node attribute distributions, we
also generated a number of synthetic graphs comparable with the real datasets just described. The
graph generation included two aspects: topology generation, for which we opted for ERGMs, and
node attribute assignments, for which we implemented the technique proposed in [99]. We discussed
Exponential-family random graph models (ERGMs) in the previous chapter (Section 2.3.2.2). As
before, we generate ERGM synthetic networks based on clustering coefficient (ERGM-cc), average
path length (ERGM-apl ), and assortativity (ERGM-dc) of the original networks using the R [83]
and the statnet suite [84].
We use the “attraction” model [99] to generate binary node attributes. This model parameterizes a labeled graph with a tendency towards homophily (ties disproportionately between those
of similar attribute background). In the basic case of a binary attribute variable and a constant
tendency to inbreed, two parameters, p and τ , both in the (0,1) interval, characterize the distribution of ties within and between the two groups. The first is the proportion of the population
that takes on one value of the attribute (with 1 − p, the proportion taking on the other value).
The second parameter, the inbreeding coefficient or probability, expresses the degree to which a tie
whose source is in one group is "attracted" to a target in that group. When τ = 0, there is no
special attraction and ties within and between groups occur in chance proportions. When τ > 0,
ties occur disproportionately within groups, increasing as τ approaches 1. Given a total number
of ties, values for p and τ determine the number of ties/edges that are between groups, namely,
δ = |E| × 2 × (1 − τ )p(1 − p). Intuitively, p captures the diversity of attribute values in the node
population (with p = 0.5 showing equal representation of the attributes) while τ captures the ho-
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mophily phenomenon (that functions as an attraction force between nodes with identical attribute
values).
We report the p and τ values for the original network as shown in Table 3.1. The homophilic
attraction metric τ varies between 0 in pokec-1 (thus, no higher than chance preference for social
ties with people of the same gender in Slovakia) to 0.99 in amazon-products (books are purchased
together with other books much more strongly than given by chance). The diversity metric p
varies between the over representation of males in the US academic Facebook networks (8% female
representation) to an almost perfect political representation in the polblogs dataset (where p = 0.48).
Note that, we only consider p as the minimum proportion of two node groups due to the symmetric
nature of attributes in our experiments.
In the process of generating synthetic node attributes, we first randomly assign two arbitrary
values (i.e., R and B) as labels to all the nodes in the graph for a given p, 1 − p split. Then, we draw
an R node and a B node at random and swap labels if it would decrease the number of R-B ties.
This process would converge when the total number of cross-group ties reduce to δ for a particular
value of τ .
Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of cross-group ties on the synthetic labelled networks generated from polblogs topology. The proportion of cross-group ties is proportional to p, while it is
inversely proportional to τ . When p reaches its maximum (pmax = 0.5 due to the symmetric nature
of binary attribute values), the proportion of cross-group ties is larger at minimum inbreeding coefficient τ . It should be noted that convergence is not guaranteed for all possible combinations of p
and τ . The swapping procedure holds constant all graph properties except the mapping of nodes to
labels, and consequently, it may not be possible to find a mapping of nodes to labels that achieves
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Figure 3.3: Proportion of cross group ties. We report the proportion of cross group ties on synthetic
labeled networks generated from the polblogs network. We use the "attraction" model [99] to
generate binary node attributes.
a target number of ties between groups (when that number is low as it is for higher values of τ ).
Table 3.2 presents the graph characteristics of the synthetically generated labeled graphs.

3.4

Empirical Results
Our objective is not to measure the success of re-identification attacks on original datasets

in which node identities have been removed: it has been demonstrated long ago [48] that naive
anonymization of graph datasets does not provide privacy. Instead, our objective is to quantify the
exposure provided by node attributes on top of the intrinsic vulnerability of the particular graph
topology under attack. In our experiments, we leverage the real and synthetic networks described
above. We use the methodology described in Section 3.2 to re-identify nodes using features based
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Table 3.2: Basic statistics of generated ERGM networks. Note that dc, cc and apl define the set of
parameters used to generate ERGM graphs based on assortativity (degree correlation), clustering
coefficient, and average path length, respectively. We generated a total of ≈ 500 million identical
and non-identical node pairs over three ERGM graph spaces of the six real social network datasets.
S is the population of generated node pairs concerning a given graph topology.
Network
polblogs
fb-caltech
fb-dartmouth
fb-michigan
pokec-1
amazon-products

ERGM
dc
cc
apl
dc
cc
apl
dc
cc
apl
dc
cc
apl
dc
cc
apl
dc
cc
apl

d
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.003
0.002
0.002
2.02E-5
2.05E-5
2.04E-5
1.82E-5
1.82E-5
1.82E-5

C
0.03
0.33
0.10
0.08
0.42
0.07
0.17
0.24
0.20
0.02
0.20
0.20
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.37
0.40
0.39

r
.08
-0.02
-0.06
0.11
-0.06
0.11
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.12
0.12
0.12
-0.04
-0.04
-0.04
-0.06
-0.06
-0.06

κ
2.52
2.69
2.49
2.13
2.73
1.97
2.66
2.77
2.70
3.28
3.52
3.64
5.60
5.84
5.63
11.86
13.52
13.47

|S| (millions)
5.5
13.1
11.5
1.2
4.1
1.2
14.5
13.2
14.2
38.4
39.9
38.2
29.5
29.3
27.3
43.7
72.5
74.3

on both graph topology and node attributes. Our first guiding question is thus: How much risk of
node re-identification is added to a network dataset by its binary node attributes?

3.4.1 The Vulnerability Cost of Node Attributes
Figure 3.4 presents the accuracy of node re-identification in the original graph topology
GS and in the same topology augmented with node attributes GS(LBL). As expected, the reidentification attack performs (generally) better when node attributes are used in the attack. Surprising to us, however, is the relatively small vulnerability cost that node attributes introduce. For
example, the occupation attribute has a barely noticeable benefit to the attacker in fb-dartmouth.
More interestingly, however, the same attribute performs differently for the other two Facebook net-
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Figure 3.4: Accuracy of predictions over original networks. Mean accuracy values are shown for real
network datasets on GS and GS(LBL) along with the T-statistic which describes the difference in
means of the GS and GS(LBL) vectors of prediction probabilities statistically. The network with
node attributes is more vulnerable to node re-identification when the T-statistic is positive and
large.
works considered: for fb-caltech the occupation label functions as noise, leading to a small decrease
in the F1-score. For fb-michigan, on the other hand, the occupation label significantly improves the
attacker’s performance.
Another observation from this figure is that different node attributes applied to the same
topology have different outcomes: see, for example, the case of the fb-michigan topology, where the
difference between the impacts of the gender and the occupation attributes is the largest. We thus
formulate a new question: What placement of attributes onto nodes reveal more information? To un-
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derstand how the placement of attribute values on nodes affects vulnerability, we generate synthetic
node attributes in a controlled manner by varying p (the diversity ratio) and τ (homophily coefficient). This allows us to study the effect of these parameters on node re-identification. Figure 3.5
presents the T-statistics of the F1-scores for node re-identification attacks on the original topology
vs. labeled versions of the original topology. In addition to the original topologies, Figure 3.5 also
presents results on various synthetic networks generated as presented in Section 3.3.2.
We observe three phenomena: First, it appears that p is positively correlated with the
T-statistic value measuring the re-identification impact of attributes. That is, the more diversity
(that is, the larger p), the more vulnerable to re-identification the labeled nodes become on average.
Intuitively, in a highly skewed attribute population, while the minority nodes will be identified
quicker due to node attributes, the majority remains protected. On the other hand, when p = 0.5,
a network has two equal-sized sets of nodes where each set takes one of two attribute values. This
is explained by the fact that the NAD feature vector captures more diverse information in the
attributes of neighbots when p is larger. This is also the explanation for why the node attributes
contribute so much more to vulnerability in the polblogs dataset, which has a large diversity (p =
0.48) (thus, almost equal numbers of conservative and liberal blogs). Note that the effect of p on
the added vulnerability remains consistent across all topologies (real and synthetic) tested.
The second observation is that there is no visible pattern on how the inbreeding coefficient
(τ ) influences the vulnerability added by binary node attributes. While this is disappointing from
the perspective of story telling, it is potentially encouraging for data sharing, as it suggests that
datasets that record homophily (or influence, the debate is irrelevant in this context) do not have
to be anonymized by damaging this pattern. For example, the privacy of a dataset that records an
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Figure 3.5: T-statistic between prediction scores of GS(LBL) and GS networks. GS represents the
network structure and GS(LBL) represents the networks with varying attributes. Results are shown
across different structures of original and ERGM graphs. Each ERGM graph is presented using the
generated parameters of dc (degree-correlation), cc(clustering coefficient) and apl (average path
length). We skip presenting fb-dartmouth in this figure to reduce visual clutter.
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information dissemination phenomenon could be provided without perturbing the cascading-related
ties.
The third class of observations is related to the relative effect of the topological characteristics
on the added vulnerability. Both amazon-products and pokec-1 are orders of magnitude sparser
than the other datasets considered. This means that the topological information available to the
machine learning algorithm is limited. In this situation, the addition of the attribute information
turns out to be very significant: the T-statistic values for these datasets are significantly larger than
for the other datasets, with values over 400 in some cases. Another topological effect is noticed
when comparing the real pokec-1 topology with the ERGM-generated ones in Figure 3.5d: the
node attribute contributes much more to the vulnerability of the original topology compared to
the synthetic topologies. The reason for this unusual behavior may lay in the different clustering
coefficients of the networks, as seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2: the ERGM-generated topologies have
clustering coefficients one order of magnitude higher than the original topology (for the same graph
density), which leads to more diverse NDD feature vectors for the networks with higher clustering
and thus richer training information. This in turn leads to better accuracy in node re-identification in
the unlabeled ERGM topologies (with higher clustering) than in the original topology. For example,
the maximum F1-score for the ERGM-dc topology is 0.92 while for the original it is 0.76 in pokec-1.
Thus, the relative benefit of the node attribute was significantly higher when the topology features
were poorer.

3.4.2 The Impact of Topology
Figure 3.6 presents the importance of features that are used in node re-identification. A high
importance score represents a feature that is responsible for accurately classifying a large proportion
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of examples. We make three observations from this figure. First, most of the NAD features that
represent node attribute information prove to be important in all datasets.
Second, among the NDD features, only a small number contributes consistently to accurate
prediction. As shown in Figures 3.6c - 3.6i, the first bin of 1-hop and 2-hop NDD vectors contribute
the most. That is, a high impact on the re-identification of a node is brought by the number of
its neighbors with degrees between 1 and 50. Even in large networks such as pokec-1 and amazonproducts with a larger range of node degrees, this behavior is observed.
Third, Figure 3.6 suggests what features explain the effect of diversity p on node reidentification in labeled networks. On datasets with large diversity (such as polblogs or pokec-1 ),
the topological information contributes less than on datasets with low diversity (such as fb-caltech
(gender)). This is because high diversity correlates to richer NAD feature vectors, and thus the
relative importance of the NAD features increases.

3.4.3 Epidemic and the Risk of Node Re-identification
In this section, we consider the scenario of node attribute placement under the constraint
of an epidemic process. We use the Susceptible-Infectious (SI) [100] model to generate an epidemic
process on the original graph topology. In the SI model, individuals are initially susceptible with
the exception of a small fraction of the population who is infectious. In contact with an infections individual, a susceptible individual becomes infectious with the probability β. Once infected,
individuals stay infected and infectious throughout their lifetime.
We use this model to assign binary attributes (i.e., susceptible and infectious) to the nodes
in the graph. In each experiment, we select the 0.1% highest degree nodes as infectious to initialize
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Figure 3.6: The importance of features across original networks. NDD features are presented in the
index order of node (N), hop (H) and bin (B). As an example, the feature N1-H2-B1 presents the
first bin of the N DD12 [k] vector. NAD features are presented in the index order of node (N), hop
(H) and binary attribute value ∈ R, B. As an example, the feature N1-H2-R presents N AD12 [R].
Any feature that does not contribute to the final prediction decision with at least 1% of the samples
in average is omitted.
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the epidemic. We vary the infection probability β between 0 and 1. We mount the machine-learning
attack to each epidemic graph independently on the graph topology GS and on the same topology
augmented with binary node attributes GS(LBL). We make two assumptions in this task. First,
we assume that the graph topology remains static during the epidemic process. Second, we assume
that the adversary does not have any prior information about other epidemic graphs in the series.
We calculate the significance of the vulnerability scores in GS(LBL) compared with GS via
a standard T-test, and report the T-statistic value per each epidemic graph. Figure 3.7 shows the
T-statistic values over multiple steps in the epidemic process including other characteristics (e.g.,
the node infection probability β, the estimated homophily τ observed in the network).
We observe the same phenomena on the correlation between population’s diversity (p) and
the T-statistic values over the epidemic graphs. However, the T-statistic values show different
patterns depending on the infection probability β. Note that, the population’s diversity (p) increases
to a local maximum in the initial time-steps, and then drops in later time-steps. This is an intuitive
observation given the properties of SI model [100].
When the epidemic grows slowly (i.e., low infection probability), the T-statistic value also
increases at a slower rate. On the other hand, when the epidemic outbreaks at a faster infection
rate, the T-statistic value also increases at a higher rate and achieves a relatively larger peak value.
For the fb-caltech network, the T-statistic value reaches a peak value of 10 in four infection steps
for β = 0.1, while the T-statistic value reaches a peak value of 50 in two infection steps for β = 0.9.
Interestingly, the most diverse population in fb-caltech network is also observed after four infection
steps for β = 0.1, and two infection steps for β = 0.9 (as shown in Figure 3.7d). In polblogs,
T-statistic values reach peak values of 31 and 36 for the infection rates of 0.1 and 0.9, respectively
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(as shown in Figure 3.7h). The polblogs population becomes more diverse in the similar number of
infection steps given the respective infection rate.
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Figure 3.7: Graph vulnerability over a series of epidemic graphs under SI model. During each
infection step, a susceptible node becomes infected with probability β if in contact with an infected
node. (a,e) the rate of infection; (b,f) p – diversity ratio which measures the proportion of nodes
with one binary attribute value; (c,g) τ – estimated value of homophily observed in the network;
and (d,h) the T-statistic value between prediction scores of GS(LBL) and GS. T-statistic values
show how the extra vulnerability due to binary attributes changes over iterations of the epidemic
process.

3.5

Summary and Discussion
This chapter shows that the addition of even a single binary attribute to nodes in a network

increases the vulnerability to node re-identification. The increase in vulnerability derives from
the fact that the machine learning attack makes use of the relationship between topology and
the distribution of node labels. Using information about the distribution of labels in a node’s
neighborhood provides additional leverage for the re-identification process, even when the labels are
rudimentary.
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Furthermore, we find that a population’s diversity with regard to the binary attribute consistently degrades anonymity and increases vulnerability. Diversity means a more even distribution
of the binary attribute, which produces a more varied set of neighborhood distributions that nodes
can exhibit. Consequently, nodes are more easily distinguished from one another by virtue of their
differing neighborhood distributions of labels.
This observation is critical for network datasets for which the node attributes are the result
of an epidemic process. If the epidemic process is monitored, an adversary could observe the node
states and their changes repeatedly over multiple time steps. In such a scenario, the adversary
could mount a strong node re-identification attack. The techniques presented in this chapter can
be applied to build strong anonymization techniques for such cases. Specifically, our techniques can
be used to estimate the rate of anonymity loss over the lifespan of an epidemic process and more
efficiently guide data owners in the process of network data anonymization.
Another outcome of this work is that there is no consistent discernible impact of homophily,
as measured by the inbreeding coefficient, on vulnerability. Our procedure for investigating the
impact of homophily simply involves swapping labels without disturbing ties. Therefore, both local
and global (unlabeled) topologies remain constant as we decrease the number of cross-group ties to
achieve a target value implied by a particular inbreeding coefficient for a given proportional split
along the binary attribute. This procedure disturbs the local labeled topology, but because the
machine learning attack uses information from that local topology, it apparently can adapt to the
changes and make equally successful predictions regardless of the value of the inbreeding coefficient.
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Chapter 4: Simulating Social Media Activity

The second part of this dissertation focuses on predicting social media activity. Our goal is to
develop techniques for high-fidelity simulations of information spread in online social environments.
A reliable simulator can be useful to foresee the spread of information in many real world scenarios.
For example, terrorist groups use “Pump and Dump” schemes to raise funds via artificially promoting
a digital currency through social media environments [101]. These groups “pump up” specific digital
currencies on Twitter to take advantage of short bursts in prices, before they “dump” the currency
for a profit [102]. A simulator that is able to predict spikes in social media activity can be used to
regulate the “Pump and Dump” attempts. In another instance, a group of Twitter accounts that
support the Venezuelan regime amplified certain topics and hashtags to discredit Juan Guaidó, the
opposition leader, after the controversial 2019 Venezuelan national election [4]. These attempts were
able to manipulate the trending topics on Twitter to control what can be seen by the international
community [103]. We can use a simulator to control the spread of certain topics in future discussions.
Such a simulator can also be used to evaluate intervention techniques to encourage engagement (e.g.,
in the case of health information dissemination) or limit misinformation (e.g., by evaluating how
misinformation diffuses if some accounts are prevented from engaging).
However, developing a reliable social simulator is not trivial [104, 105]. As shown in Figure 4.1, social media activity can be described at different granularities. The finest granularity of
predictions describes when a social media message is posted, who posts the message, what it is about
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(topic), and whether it is in response to another message. The complexity of the problem increases
when the granularity of the predictions becomes finer. For example, it is easier to predict the volume
of social media discussions in a given time interval (when) than predicting who would interact with
such discussions. However, predicting exactly which user will post or reshare a message is a difficult
(if at all possible) task based on only observing platform activity. For example, Bollenbacher et
al. [106] argue that predicting microscopic user actions is difficult in long-lived online conversations.
This limitation is mainly due to the accumulation of errors in long range simulations. In addition,
social media content changes rapidly over time as it is subject to both internal (e.g., opinion leaders)
and external (e.g., street violence, natural disaster) influences. Thus, a reliable simulator needs to
realistically respond to internal and external stimuli.
One distinctive feature of a simulator is the ability to forecast social media activity in future
timesteps without relying on the ground truth in the previous time step. This capability can be
thought as generalizing single timestep predictions to hundreds of future timestep predictions. This
generalization is also associated with the granularity of predictions that one seeks to achieve. For
example, one needs to predict whether a particular user is going to post a message tomorrow, or
some day within the next week. In another instance, one can develop a timeseries regression model
to predict the volume of activities in the next two weeks without relying on any ground truth
information in the testing period.
The reliability of a simulator can be measured by different metrics. For example, timeseries
predictions can be evaluated by the error between the prediction and ground truth. The interaction
between different users can be evaluated by comparing the structural properties of the user interaction network with the ground truth. The performance of simulators is often compared against a
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Figure 4.1: The granularity of predictions in decreasing order of complexity. Social media prediction
tasks are grouped based on different problem domains addressed in the literature.
baseline model. While there are several ways to create a baseline model for social media simulations,
repeating the most recent records in the future is competitive [107].
In this chapter, we first discuss the related attempts that address various parts of the social
media activity prediction (Section 4.1). Finally, we explain two scenarios that motivate the design of
social simulators presented in this dissertation (Section 4.2). This chapter provides the background
for the contributions made in subsequent chapters.

4.1

Related Work
Related work has looked at pieces of the simulation problem using a variety of social media

datasets. We group the related work on simulating social media activity into four main problem
domains: i) timeseries forecasting, ii) cascade prediction, iii) recommendation systems, and iv)
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network link prediction. We map different granularity of social media activity predictions to these
problem domains as shown in Figure 4.1.

4.1.1 Timeseries Forecasting
Previous studies developed many regression methods for the timeseries forecasting tasks [108].
Popular statistical methods include Exponential Smoothing (ES) and the Autoregressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA). Several deep learning methods such as Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNN) and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN) have been proposed to deal with both univariate
and multivariate timeseries prediction. These generalized methods are applicable to the problem of
forecasting the volume of social media discussions over time.
Agent-based-modeling (ABM) techniques use both statistical and deep learning timeseries
regression methods to forecast individual user activity streams [107]. For example, Abdelzaher et
al. [107] represent each user’s activity by a timeseries of K elements, where each element represents
the user activity in an arbitrary time slot (e.g., hours, days, etc.). They used both ARIMA and deep
neural networks (such as CNN, and RNN) to predict the next K elements of the timeseries. This
approach has several limitations. First, they implemented separate models to capture the activity
streams of different users. This approach did not scale well when there are millions of users who
participate in social media discussions. Second, the majority of users have very few actions, thus
making the timeseries very sparse. One way of dealing with this issue is to group users by their
activity level. For example, given an activity threshold, we can group users into two sets of active
and sparse acting users. While there are rich activity patterns that exist for active users, the actions
of inactive users are more likely to be irregular and sparse. In their experiments, Abdelzaher et
al. [107] showed competitive performance for sparse acting users when repeating elements of the
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past timeseries as predictions of the future. Third, the optimal granularity to define a time slot is
different for differently active users. For example, there are hyper active users who share messages
frequently within hourly intervals, while others share very few messages within a day [109]. While
the granularity of a day seems an optimal choice in general since there are many inactive users in
social media environments [110], it would not capture the hourly activity patterns of hyper active
users. These smaller granular time predictions are important for scenarios like "Pump and Dump"
schemes, where specific groups promote digital currencies on Twitter in short time intervals [102].
A similar challenge is to capture bursty Twitter activity that occur within minutes or hours during
exceptional events (e.g., NBA finals) [111].
Graph Convolutional Networks (GCNs) were proposed for univariate timeseries forecasting [112, 113]. One such popular architecture is called Diffusion Convolutional Recurrent Neural
Networks (DCRNN). This technique was originally proposed for traffic forecasting and claimed to be
general on any univariate timeseries forecasting [112]. Hernandez et al. [109] applied this technique
on multiple social media datasets, and showed its poor performance for forecasting user activity
timeseries. They provide lessons similar to Abdelzaher et al. [107] as the performance degrades
depending on the heterogeneity of user activity. A major understanding is that sparse user activity
patterns remain challenging to predict with different forecasting methods.

4.1.2 Cascade Prediction
Many studies tried to predict the popularity of particular social media messages (what)
over time (when) [114]. The popularity prediction task is usually defined as finding the number of
reposts that an original message receives in discrete time intervals [115]. Feature-based methods
often utilize hashtags, URLs, mentions, sentiment and topics as textual features extracted from
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the original messages [116]. Sentiment features are shown to be most useful to predict message
popularity [117, 118]. For example, a message becomes more popular when it is associated with
negative sentiment [119]. Some works [115, 120, 121] showed that the usefulness of textual features
depends on the spread of the content under consideration. In one study [115], content features (e.g.,
title, caption) are shown to be weak predictors for the popularity of images shared on Facebook. On
the other hand, user profile features (e.g., followers, age, etc.) are shown to be more important than
content features [120]. Other research suggests that social network structural features (e.g., mean
degree, cascade height) and temporal features (e.g., time elapsed, maximum/mean time decay) are
effective as user features for the popularity prediction tasks [122]. Several works show the significant
advantage of using temporal features in the popularity prediction task [123, 124]. Temporal features
are shown to be more useful in smaller cascades than in larger cascades [125].
Many previous works showed that predicting the popularity of a message is not trivial [114].
Later, it was shown that the initial popularity of the message is useful to predict the final state of
popularity [126, 127, 106, 128]. Based on this understanding, several methods were developed using
deep learning algorithms [126, 15] to predict multiple dimensions of message popularity (e.g., cascade
size, shape, virality etc.) given the initial message growth. Embedded-IC [129] embeds cascade nodes
in a latent diffusion space to predict the temporal activation of a node. DeepCas [126] proposed a
diffusion-embedding framework to predict the incremental growth of a cascade. Both Embedding-IC
and DeepCas exploit the paths in a cascade to improve the accuracy of the prediction task. Zayats
et al. [130] proposed a graph-structured LSTM model to predict the popularity of Reddit comments
in terms of the votes they received. This model was able to distinguish the controversial comments
from the positive comments with the help of words associated with humour and emotion categories.
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Techniques that predict the popularity of conversations are mostly based on statistical approaches [131, 132, 133]. Wang et al. [134] proposed a theoretical model to capture the temporal
evolution of conversation trees by employing a Levy process. They used the preferential attachment
mechanism to build conversation trees. Aragon et al. [135] used reciprocity (i.e., strong exchange
of messages between users) as a behavioral feature to predict the temporal evolution of a conversation with respect to the depth of a tree. The proposed statistical approach utilizes the mutual
dependency between the authorship and conversation structure. Several works [136, 128] model
the dynamics of conversation trees using a Hawkes process. Medvedev et al. [136] estimated the
parameters from the initial comments of a conversation to predict the remainder. Krohn et al. [128]
improved the previous solution in the proposed CTPM model as the parameters are estimated from
the post information. More recently, Bollenbacher et al. [106] proposed the Tree Growth Model
(TGM) to predict the final size and shape of conversations given the partial conversation tree information. However, the predictive performance of these statistical approaches deteriorate due to
the dependence on the chosen parameters and optimization of the likelihood function.
While significant work has focused on predicting individual cascades, less attention has been
invested in predicting the popularity of a group of cascades. For example, several works predict the
aggregate volume of user activities on Twitter via Hawkes processes that model the events around
a group of cascades [137, 138]. Krishnan et al. [139] extracted several structural features from a set
of cascade trees (i.e., a forest of cascades) to distinguish viral cascades from broadcasts. Theoretical
models that capture the spread of social-influence when a group of competitive cascades evolve over
a network have also been proposed [140, 141]. Other works have made similar observations when
exploring inter-related cascades in multiplex networks [142]. These studies stress the importance of
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focusing on a group of cascades instead of an individual cascade for improving the prediction results
of user-level diffusion behavior.
Another line of work develops deep learning models to predict the future actions of social
media users. DeepDiffuse [127] is an LSTM architecture to predict the next user who participates
in a cascade. Islam et al. [143] used a recurrent neural network architecture to predict a user’s next
action augmented by her neighbors’ recent actions on Flickr, Flixster, Gowalla, and Digg social
platforms. TopoLSTM [144] uses the network structure to predict next activated user in a cascade.
RBMHDRN [145] was proposed to predict whether a particular user would retweet a given piece of
content on Weibo. They extracted a various set of content, user, and network related features to
solve this classification task. Myer et al. [146] found that the future action of a user in a cascade
is dependent on her previous exposures to multiple other cascades on Twitter. In a similar setting,
Weng et al. [147] developed an agent-based model to predict the probability of a user performing
a retweet when exposed to multiple memes on Twitter. They discovered an adversely negative
and positive effect on simultaneous cascades that are of unrelated and related content, respectively.
These solutions are limited to users who have already been seen in the past cascades.
On the other hand, few studies predict the popularity of topics [148, 149], hashtags [150],
or keywords [151] shared on Twitter messages. Liu et al. [148] explore machine learning methods
to predict whether and when a topic will become prevalent. The authors highlight the challenges
faced on forecasting the frequency of topics discussed by users due to irregular patterns. Yin et
al. [149] demonstrate that topics prevalent on Twitter can be categorized into temporal topics (e.g.,
breaking events) and stable topics (e.g., user interests). They utilize both the network structure and
temporal information to predict the popularity of temporal and stable topics. Saleiro et al. [151]
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classify the popularity of named entity mentions (e.g., "Ronaldo") on Twitter as high or low in
the following hours using the features extracted from news articles. They found news articles carry
different predictive power based on the nature of the entities under study. Dutta et al. [152] predict
the volume of Reddit discussions in a future time horizon leveraging the text from news and an
initial set of comments using a recurrent neural network architecture. Shrestha et al. [153] used a
deep learning model to forecast the number of retweets and mentions of a specific news source on
Twitter using the network structure observed in the day before the predictions. They found that
small, but dense network structures are helpful in the predictions.
In summary, many previous studies predicted the growth of cascades in various macro-level
properties (e.g., size, virality). They experimented with a variety of features that represent the
user, content and temporal attributes. However, many studies assumed to have the initial growth
of the cascades as input for this prediction task. This is an impractical assumption to make when
simulating social media activity. On the other hand, several studies predicted the popularity of
content (e.g., topics, hashtags) spread on social media platforms. While some studies only classified
the level of popularity, others assumed to know the ground truth information on the day before
predictions. In a simulation task that attempts to predict the social media activity in a future time
horizon, we might not have the ground truth information on the previous day of the predictions.

4.1.3 Recommendation Systems
The goal of a recommendation system is to predict the probability of a user to interact with
an item [154]. Da’u et al. [155] provide the most recent systematic review on the recommendation
system literature. Popular techniques are collaborative filtering (CF) [156, 157, 158], content-based
(CB) [159], and deep learning models [160].
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CF techniques leverage the user-user and item-item relationships to make recommendation.
These techniques suffer from cold start and sparsity issues due to inadequate information present in
the both user and item space. For example, when there are new users or new items, CF techniques
fail to make any predictions. On the other hand, CB methods are capable of predicting the user
who would interact with a new item. In contrast to CF, CB methods use the content description
of the item which allows them to make predictions for items that are not seen in the training
data. However, CB methods only use the past actions of a user to predict the future, but ignore
any related user information. Due to this reason, CB methods are only capable of predicting
recommendations for users who are already seen in the training data. While there are many deep
learning models such as Autoencoders (AEs), Restricted-Boltzmann-Machines (RBMs), Deep Belief
Networks (DBNs), Deep-Boltzmann-Machines (DBMs), Generative Adversarial Network (GAN)
proposed in the recommendation systems literature [155], many such methods are evaluated on
movie and e-commerce domains, but rarely on social network data.
More recently, Kumar et al. [161] proposed JODIE to predict the user who would interact
with a subreddit or Wikipedia page in the future. They used a recurrent neural network model to
learn dynamic embedding vectors of users based on a sequence of temporal interactions. GraphRec
is another model that used graph neural networks (GNN) to learn the embedding vectors for users
present in the user-item graph and the user-user social graph. They represent the edges in the useritem graph with the users’ opinions on items (e.g., a user likes item x, and dislikes item y). They
found that a combination of social relationship features and opinion features lead to more accurate
recommendation results. Both JODIE and GraphRec are not capable of making predictions for
users who appear only in the test data.
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There is a recent trend of applying machine learning methods to improve social media
recommendation algorithms. Most recent attempts in this line of work are due to the annual ACM
RecSys grand challenge that is organized by Twitter [162]. In the 2020 challenge [163], the problem
was to predict the probability of a user engaging with Twitter interactions such as like, reply, retweet,
and quote tweet. The winning solution used a variety of good features that represent the importance
of users and message content [164]. However this challenge problem is different from our simulation
problem for two main reasons. First, it assumes both a user and a message exist in the testing
period. This is an impractical assumption to make when simulating a social system. Simulators do
not assume to have any prior knowledge in the testing period. Second, it does not ask when such
interaction is going to happen. For example, a classifier can predict the binary interaction between
a user and a message but it assumes such interaction may happen sometime in the future without
directly specifying it. In contrast, a reliable simulator should predict the timing of such interactions
more accurately.
In summary, there are various techniques developed to improve recommendation systems
in general, but not many evaluated on social networks. The challenge here is how to develop
recommendation algorithms for users whose interests change over time [161].

4.1.4 Network Link Prediction
Predicting future links in a social network is a popular task in the social science community.
Recent survey papers on link prediction [165] and social influence prediction [166] review a decade of
research in this field. There are two types of link prediction tasks. They include predicting missing
links in a static graph, and ranking most probable links in a future snapshot of a dynamic graph.
Traditional models use hand-crafted features to achieve good performance. Distance-based features
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(e.g., shortest path), and neighborhood features (e.g., the number of common neighbors, Jaccard’s
coefficient, Adamic-Adar index, Katz index) are the most effective features in the link prediction
tasks [165].
Most recent network link prediction methods use Graph Neural Networks (GNN) [167]. The
major benefit of GNN methods is the ability to make predictions for nodes unseen in training. GNNs
achieve this capability via representing nodes with the features extracted from the local network
neighborhood structure. This feature extraction process is done automatically by learning a function
to aggregate the local network’s neighborhoods information. Once learnt, this function is able to
distinguish different node’s local neighborhood structures. Many GNN methods (e.g., GCN [168],
GAT [169], GraphSAGE [170]) are proposed in the literature. The key distinctions among many
GNN methods are in how different approaches aggregate local network neighborhoods information.
Despite the recent success of GNN methods in the network link prediction literature, they
have limitations. Theoretically it is proven that GNN methods are not significantly more powerful
than Weisfeiler-Lehman (WL) graph kernels [171]. WL kernel is a simple iterative neighborhood
aggregation method that was widely used to solve the graph isomorphism problem [172]. Another
concern is due to the benchmark graph datasets that are typically used to evaluate GNN methods.
For example, a recent study [173] showed that combining label propagation and feature augmentation techniques can beat the GNN performance on homophilous graph datasets that are widely
used in the GNN literature.
In summary, there has been a significant advancement made in the network link prediction
research both in terms of the features and the techniques (e.g., GNN). However, many traditional
predictive models are built only for the nodes who are already seen in the training data (transductive
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capability), but not for the new nodes who only appeared in the testing data (inductive capability).
While recent deep learning methods overcome this issue to some extent [170], more experiments are
required to test the robustness and generalizability of these methods over different types of social
networks.

4.1.5 Simulating Finer Grained Social Media Activity
The studies related to predicting finer grained social media activity are lacking. Most recent
attempts in this space are part of the Computational Simulation of Online Social Behavior (SocialSim) program sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency [174]. Abdelzaher
et al. [107] proposed SocialCube, an agent-based approach to predict social media activities. This
solution decides optimal agent-specific configurations from past social media traces. Garibay et
al. [175] proposed DeepAgent to simulate the social media activity in the population, community,
user, and content levels. This framework used a generative rule-driven approach where specific rule
sets were built to model agent behavior using both endogenous and exogenous signals. While we
have similar objectives, our solutions are not composed using specific individual agents’ actions or
hand-crafted rule sets.

4.2

Simulation Scenarios
The main goal of having a reliable social media simulator is to foresee the activities of a

social media platform more accurately than what can be predicted by chance [176], or what can be
judged by a human operator [177].
This dissertation focuses on two scenarios that motivate the design of the social simulators
that we developed. We classify these scenarios by the endogenous and exogenous input features that
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Table 4.1: The overview of the simulation scenarios.
Input Features

Output Granularity

Endogenous

Who says to Whom When

Endogenous
and
Exogenous

Who says What to Whom When

Evaluated Context
Organic discussions on
cyber-security and
crypto-currency
community
Political crisis in
Venezuela

Platform
Reddit

Twitter

we used to train a simulator (as shown in Table 4.1). We discuss the design and implementation of
these simulators in the subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 5: Simulating Online Discussion Threads Using Endogenous Signals3

Discussions on social media have significant impact on society. From recruitment to political movements to disinformation campaigns, social media discussions are the driving mechanism for
information diffusion and user engagement. A particular variation of online discussions is a conversation tree, as seen on Reddit, StackOverflow, or Digg. In Reddit, for example, conversations are
grouped on user-defined topics (often known as subreddits). The root of the conversation tree is an
original post by a registered user; users respond with comments to the original post or other users’
comments, repeatedly getting involved in the same conversation. Messages are often repeatedly
exchanged between two users in a long conversation chain [135]. Discussions may lead to provocative, offensive, or menacing comments that end up involving an increased number of reactions and
users [132].
Forecasting how conversations will evolve on such platforms is useful to many applications.
For example, while it is difficult to know how many users follow a conversation over time without
contributing to it, the number of users who contribute can help estimate the number of users
exposed to the conversation. This information can be used to trigger the intervention of a subreddit
administrator, for example, if the original posts are predicted to create unwanted engagement such as
a coordinated disinformation campaign that is not likely to pass unnoticed. Accurately predicting
the group of highly engaged users is important for developing intervention techniques to control
information or manipulation spread and to accurately gauge the community opinion.
3

A part of this chapter was previously published in [178]. Permission is included in Appendix A.

82

One challenge of addressing this problem is that real environments consist of simultaneous
conversations on related topics [146]. For example, a user can engage multiple times in the same
discussion thread; the same user can participate in multiple related conversation threads, thus
affecting the overall audience size; simultaneous related conversation threads might compete for the
attention of the same users, thus impeding or accelerating their involvement. Thus, one needs to
take the groups of simultaneous conversations into account when developing a reliable simulator.
Much of the previous work has focused on predicting isolated properties of individual social
media conversations such as size [179], temporal growth [126], and virality [115]. However, these
efforts assume to know the initial growth of a conversation to predict the property of interest in the
remainder of the conversation. The initial growth of a conversation in the first few hours has been
shown to be most useful in predicting the future growth of the conversation [114].
This chapter proposes a method for forecasting the ensuing conversations with timing and
authorship properties when given a set of topic-related original posts in a continuous interval of
time on a platform. The contributions of this chapter are the following:

• We predict the properties of conversations in a finer granularity that include whether, when,
and by whom a comment will be made in response to a post or another comment. This contribution is evaluated in terms of conversation structure (size and virality) and user engagement
over time.
• We focus on predicting groups of conversations instead of individual conversations. We show
that this focus is beneficial in accurately predicting the collective behavior of users who participate in multiple conversations.

83

• In contrast to most related work, our method only assumes to know the original post (or
root of individual conversations), without initial reaction information. Previous studies used
the comments that a post receives in the first few hours to predict the remainder of the
conversation.

This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 presents our solution in detail. We describe
the dataset that we use to evaluate our solution in Section 5.2. Performance results are presented
in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 summarizes the contributions presented in this chapter.

5.1

Predicting Pools of Conversations
Our objective is to predict the microscopic properties of a set of possibly inter-related,

simultaneous conversations over time. The operational scenario we are considering is the following:
given the initial postings described by content, author, and time on a given social platform (such
as the four messages depicted on the horizontal time axis in Figure 5.1), generate the emerging
discussion threads by specifying which message is in response to which message, and the author
and time of each message. Each discussion thread generated will be represented as a conversation
tree, where a child node is a message in response to its parent node in the tree; users can engage
repeatedly within a conversation; the delay in responding to a previous message is unbounded; and
a user may respond to his own message, typically with additions or clarifications. Table 5.1 presents
the terminology used in this chapter.
Our solution is as follows. We probabilistically generate pools of independent conversation
trees rooted in each input seed. We assign users and timing information to all nodes in every conversation tree. We thus end up with naive groupings of independent conversations, where user and
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Figure 5.1: Sample simulation scenario. Given four original posts, the objective is to generate the
corresponding conversation trees given that previously unseen users can engage in conversations;
messages may be posted with unbounded delay; some original posts will remain unanswered; the
conversation trees will have highly different structures; users may engage repeatedly with the same
or different conversations.

Table 5.1: Terminology used in this chapter.
Term
Node
Conversation tree
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Conversation
Node degree

pool
size
pool size
depth
breadth

Seed
Propagation delay
Structural virality
Collectivity

Description
Message in a discussion thread described by content, author,
and posting time
A conversation thread represented as a tree of messages,
as shown in Figure 5.2a
A collection of conversation trees within a finite period
The number of messages in a conversation
The total number of messages in all the conversations in a pool
The number of levels in a conversation tree
The number of messages in a given level of a conversation tree
The number of immediate messages in response to the
parent message
A message at the root of the conversation tree
The time difference between the posting of a message
and that of its parent
Wiener Index of a conversation tree [180]
Group behavior of users engaged in multiple conversations
[181]
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time assignment to messages in a conversation are oblivious to what happens in other conversations
in the same pool (Section 5.1.1). We then use a genetic algorithm to reconstruct a realistic pool of
conversations from the arbitrarily generated ones (Section 5.1.2).

5.1.1 Generating Pools of Conversations
We employ the branching model [182] to construct pools of conversations. We are building
on research [26] that shows that branching models based on node degree distributions can be used
to accurately generate sub-trees of conversations. In this work, we extend this technique to generate
temporal conversation structures of any depth while attaching user information.
We build each conversation tree recursively, as presented in Algorithm 1. The steps of this
algorithm are as follows. From the training dataset that contains a large number of conversation
trees, we build degree distributions per level. Thus, for each level, we will have a degree distribution
for the nodes located at that level across all conversation trees. The node degree is defined as the
number of children of that node in the conversation tree. Given an initial seed that functions as the
root of the conversation tree to be generated, we recursively build tree structures by selecting node
degrees from the degree distribution of the corresponding level. For a set of n input seeds, we thus
generate n independent conversation trees that we consider a pool.
In order to assign authors to nodes in a conversation tree, we exploit the social network
topology of previous user interactions. Specifically, from the training dataset, we extract the interaction network in which vertices are users and directed edges represent previous interactions. We
also extract edge weights that represent the number of previous interactions. Note that a user can
be part of her own neighborhood if she replied to her own post in the past. This is reflected by a
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Algorithm 1 Probabilistic Generation of a Conversation Pool
prerequisites: degree distributions per level of a conversation
input: parent node
output: a conversation tree
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

function generate_conversation(parent, conversation)
if parent is N U LL then
root_level ← 0
root_degree ← sample_degree(root_level)
parent ← N ode(root_level, root_degree)
conversation.set_root(parent)
level ← parent.get_level()
Nchildren ← parent.get_degree()
for j ← 1 to Nchildren do
child_level ← level + 1
child_degree ← sample_degree(level)
child ← N ode(child_level, child_degree, parent)
conversation.set_child(child)
return generate_conversation(child, conversation)

input: seeds1 . . . seedsN
output: a pool of conversations

2:
4:
6:
8:

function generate_conversation_pool(seeds[])
seed_size ← length(seeds)
conversation_pool ← []
for k ← 1 to seed_size do
conversation ← T ree()
conversation.set_root(seedsk )
generate_conversation(seedsk , conversation)
conversation_pool[k] ← conversation
return conversation_pool

weighted self-loop in the network. We use this directed, weighted interaction network to bias the
assignment of users to messages as follows. We start with a conversation tree, as generated above,
whose root has a user assigned (from the input data). Recursively, for every node with a user u
assigned, we probabilistically select d users from u’s neighbors N (u) in the interaction network and
assign them as authors to the node’s d children. If d > N (u), we add (d − N (u)) new users who
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were previously not seen in the training data to the chain of responses. We bias the probabilistic
selection using the weights in the interaction network. Note that this approach allows for the same
user to participate multiple times in the conversation tree.
In order to assign time to nodes in the conversation tree, we use a propagation delay distribution conditioned by the size of the conversation. We consider the propagation delay as the
difference between the time of each comment and the time of parent comment/post in the training
dataset. For each conversation, we extract the size of the conversation and the sequence of propagation delays. In the generated conversation, we use the size of the conversation resulting from
the generation process (Algorithm 1) to randomly select a sequence of propagation delays from a
previously seen conversation of that size. We sort the nodes of the generated conversation by level,
assign the propagation delay to nodes, and compute the message time using the time of the seed
message and the assigned propagation delay.
After this procedure, we end up with conversation trees rooted in the original message from
the input data, in which each message node has a user and a time assigned. This simple probabilistic
approach generates pools of independent conversations that ignore multiple aspects of real-world
behavior, such as users participating in multiple conversations within the same period of time or,
alternatively, being unable to participate simultaneously in many conversations. During empirical
evaluations based on a variety of performance metrics that will be described later, we observed that
all pools perform comparably and poorly when compared with testing data.

88

5.1.2 Reconstructing a Realistic Pool of Conversations
Ideally, given a set of possible pools of n conversations each corresponding to the n input
seeds, we would construct a new pool consisting of the “best” conversation for each seed. However,
there are two challenges. First, it is impossible to know which conversation is the best before the
testing of the entire pool. This is mainly due to the huge variety of possible conversations that can
be generated randomly.
Second, using a single performance metric that evaluates the "goodness" of individual conversations, selecting a pool of the best such individual conversations does not lead to a pool good
enough in other metrics. For example, a pool constructed from the best individual conversations
according to structural property metrics might evaluate poorly in user-level metrics.
To address these challenges, we treated the pool reconstruction problem as an optimization
problem that we solved using a genetic algorithm. As the fitness function in the genetic algorithm, we
used the output of two trained machine learning models to evaluate the goodness of a conversation.

5.1.2.1

Modeling the Problem using a Genetic Algorithm
Genetic algorithms provide powerful search heuristics for complex search spaces [183]. To

proceed with the standard steps of genetic algorithms, we map our problem into the genetic algorithm context as follows: We consider a gene an individual conversation, represented by the message
tree with assigned user and timing information attached to nodes. An individual in the genetic algorithmic representation is thus a pool of conversations in our context. The population is the set of
conversation pools we generated with the probabilistic approaches described earlier. The objective
is to create a pool of conversations that outperforms any existing pool of conversations.
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We use the standard framework of a genetic algorithm and repeat the process until there
is no improvement in the best solution. We start with the initial set of n conversation pools as
described earlier. We measure the fitness of a conversation pool using two trained machine-learning
models as described next. We rank the conversation pools according to the fitness function and
consider only the top 80% for mate selection. Given a pair of conversation pools selected from a topranked pool and a least-ranked pool in this top 80% pools, we randomly draw conversations (without
replacement) to form a new pool for the next generation. Thus, the new generation entirely consists
of conversations from the top 80% of the conversation pools in the previous generation. Accordingly,
we re-construct n new pools for each generation. We summarize all algorithmic steps in Algorithm 2.
We do not use mutations in this approach for the following reason. Mutations require
modifying the initial conversation structures (with user and timing information) generated by the
probabilistic model. The mapping of users to the internal conversation nodes is done via a recursive
chain of user assignments using the interaction network. When we modify the structure, this method
of mapping users becomes obsolete and leads to an inaccurate view of user responses.

5.1.2.2

Ranking Pools of Conversations with Machine Learning
In order to rank the pools of conversations, we assign a goodness score to each conversation

in the pool and consider the sum of all such scores as the goodness score of the pool. The goodness
score of each conversation has two components: a score relative to the structural properties (i.e., the
shape of the conversation tree), and a score relative to the timing of the nodes in the conversation.
Specifically, we feed each conversation into two trained machine-learning models to assess the goodness of the branching factor and propagation delay with respect to the attached user information
and semantic structure.
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Algorithm 2 Selection of the Best Conversation Pool with a Genetic Algorithm
input: a set of conversation pools, γ the probability of mate selection
output: a set of re-constructed conversation pools
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

function nextGeneration(P,γ)
P ← rank_pools(P )
Pmates ← select_best_pools(P, γ)
Pgen ← reconstruct_pools(Pmates )
return Pgen

input: initial set of conversation pools
output: best conversation pool
function generate(P,γ, NGens )
for N1 ← 1 to NGens do
P ← nextGeneration(P, γ)
4:
P ← rank_pools(P )
pool ← select_best_pool(P )
6:
return pool
2:

(a) Conversation Tree

(b) Individual Conversation

(c) A Pool of Conversations

Figure 5.2: Representation of conversation trees. a) Nodes (messages) are ordered chronologically.
Yellow nodes represent internal nodes and blue nodes are leaf nodes. b) Each node is represented
by a spatio-temporal feature vector. Feature vectors are ordered chronologically and grouped by
conversation. c) Multiple conversations of arbitrary size are stacked together for training/testing.
We use two individual-level properties—branching factor and propagation delay—of conversation nodes as the target units for the prediction tasks. Any information regarding branches
is important for the accurate creation of the conversation structure as they evolve in the form of
sub-trees under the same original post or another comment [132]. Therefore, we first classify the
messages as leaf or branch nodes in the tree. Note that these node positions determine the shape
of the conversation.
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We classify the messages by the delay with which they are posted in response to their
parents to distinguish fast-paced conversations from slow-paced conversations. We consider the
median propagation delay within a conversation as the borderline between the two classes: messages
with a propagation delay larger than this median are called late adopters, while the others are
early adopters. We used this binary classification approach to seek the hourly time granularity
predictions. We discovered empirically that the median propagation delay is close to 1.5 hours and
a binary classification satisfies the hourly granularity. For finer time granularity, we might need to
classify propagation delays by quartiles, or predicting the exact propagation delay value in seconds.
This would remain as future work to improve the time predictions.
Each message is described by features from three main categories: i) spatio-temporal features, that capture the position of an individual message in a conversation, ii) user features, and
iii) content features. These features are detailed in Table 5.4. We use the LSTM model to capture the chronological order of messages in a conversation. The input to the LSTM algorithm
is a conversation as shown in Figure 5.2b. We use the memory-cell design of a standard LSTM
in our work [184] which is implemented in Keras [185]. Our LSTM setup includes two blocks of
memory-cells with 32 and 8 hidden units, and we use the Adam algorithm for the optimization with
a learning rate of 0.001 based on hyper-parameter optimization. Conversation representations are
different in shape mainly by the number of messages in the online conversation, and thus we input
them one by one for training.
During testing, we extract the features described in Table 5.4 from the generated conversations. The activity-level features of the users in a particular conversation are constructed considering
their activities in other conversations. To account for the interaction among multiple conversation
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trees, we dynamically update the user features. Specifically, when a user j is assigned to a message
0

in a new conversation tree at time t, her activity features such as the number of past activities Atj
0

at time t0 < t is updated to Atj = Atj + 1. Since we do not predict the content of the messages in a
conversation, we assign content-level features to messages in the testing period randomly based on
previously seen conversation nodes in the same level.
Once we construct the data structure shown in Figure 5.2b with all necessary features, we
infer one binary vector that represents branch/leaf using the branch discriminator model, and another binary vector that represents the early/late adopters using the delay discriminator model. We
consider these two binary vectors as the inferred ground truth to assess the generated conversation.
The assessment is done by comparing the inferred ground truth with the same binary vectors extracted from the generated conversations using the area under the curve (AUC). Each conversation
receives a goodness score as the mean of two AUC scores from the two models. The goodness of
a pool of conversations is the sum of the goodness scores of the conversations in the pool. We use
this pool goodness score to rank the pools of conversations in the genetic algorithm (as shown in
RANK_POOL function in Algorithm 2).

5.2

Datasets
For empirical evaluations, we focus on Reddit conversations. We selected two active topics,

crypto-currency, and cyber-security, as our two topic-driven separate datasets. We extracted all
conversations between January 2015 and August 2017 posted under the topic-related subreddits
and listed in Table 5.2. Both datasets were provided privately as part of the DARPA SocialSim
program.
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Table 5.2: Subreddits used for data collection. We collected 0.2M conversations from 9 subreddits
related to crypto-currency and 1.76M conversations from 38 subreddits related to cyber-security.
Domain
Crypto-currency

Cyber-security

List of Subreddits
/r/Bitcoin, /r/Ethereum, /r/Monero, /r/Paycon, /r/DopeCoin,
/r/Lisk, /r/Donationcoin, /r/Pivx, /r/Orocoin
/r/netsec, /r/netseclounge, /r/technology, /r/techsupport,
/r/pcmasterrace, /r/linux, /r/hacking, /r/Piracy,
/r/sysadmin, /r/HowToHack, /r/privacy, /r/Windows10,
/r/programming, /r/networking, /r/softwaregore,
/r/compsci,/r/talesfromtechsupport, /r/msp, /r/security,
/r/SocialEngineering, /r/Malware, /r/AskNetsec,
/r/blackhat, /r/ReverseEngineering, /r/crypto, /r/pwned,
/r/netsecstudents, /r/securityCTF, /r/hacktivism,
/r/browsers,/r/linuxadmin, /r/websec, /r/antivirus,
/r/Ransomware, /r/Pentesting, /r/OpenHacker,
/r/blackhatting, /r/Android

We represented each conversation thread as a conversation tree. A node in the conversation
tree consists of the textual content of a Reddit message (post or comment) and its author. A pair of
nodes (source to target) are connected by a directed edge where the direction suggests that the target
node reacts to (content posted by) the source node. Table 5.3 presents the structural properties of
the conversations in the two datasets. The cyber-security dataset is nearly 10 times the size of the
crypto-currency dataset in the total number of messages posted. The properties of the conversation
trees are also highly different in scale: the largest conversation in cyber-security contains 74K
messages, while in crypto-currency is 7.8K. The depths of the conversation trees are different: 971
vs. 160. Irrespective of the size and depth disparities, we observe that Reddit conversations are viral
and broad. They include both slow (cyber-security) and fast-paced (crypto-currency) conversations
which can be active for short and long periods. (as seen in Figure 5.3). Moreover, the discussions
that originate from crypto-currency subreddits exhibit diverse characteristics related to the scale
and speed of discussion spread [186].
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Table 5.3: Properties of Reddit conversations in our datasets.
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Figure 5.3: Basic characteristics of Reddit conversations. The distribution of cascades is presented
by (a,d) size, (b,e) depth, (c,f) the mean delay between the time of a comment and the time of the
original post as observed in the conversations.
Figure 5.4 depicts a sample group of conversations on Reddit related to the Bitcoin scaling
debate [187] from August 2017. The debate eventually led to the creation of a new crypto-currency,
Bitcoin Cash (BCH), along with a new software repository on GitHub that implemented the scaleup solution. There are users who repeatedly participate in the same and multiple conversations
during the debate. For example, there are 57 conversations with 4,418 messages posted by 1,458
users. 218 and 83 users appeared in more than one, and two conversations, respectively.
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Introducing Bitcoin Cash(BCH) that splits Bitcoin’s
(BTC) original blockchain via a hard fork — a
consequence of popular Bitcoin scaling debate

“We need off-chain
scaling and on-chain
scaling.Our stupid
politics is hurting
Bitcoin because
we're separating the
two necessary parts
of the overall
solution.”

..“I miss those
days man and
got tired of
these scaling
topics.”..

Discussion on the
advantages of Bitcoin
Cash (BCH) on
scalability — “Bitcoin
Cash (BCH) totally fixes
the quadratic scaling of
sighash operations bug”
“Don't fall for the big
block argument while we
are so close to have the
scaling solution.”

“..but he made
a mistake in
the scaling
debate”

Figure 5.4: Discussions on Reddit during the Bitcoin scaling debate.
From these datasets we extract three groups of features (detailed in Table 5.4): i) spatiotemporal features, ii) user-level features, and iii) content-level features. We represent the topology
around an individual node in the conversation using two spatio-temporal properties: degree and the
birth order of the predecessors. As an example, we use the degree and birth order of the parent
(level i − 1) and the grand-parent (level i − 2) nodes to represent a node in level i.
Actions in a conversation could be in response to the users who authored the previous
message rather than simply to the content with which the users interact. We thus represent a user
via a set of features describing her status on the platform, measured by the amount of activity she has
done before the particular reaction. Such activities reflect the user’s interest in other conversation
threads. We also extract the popularity of the user in terms of upvotes and downvotes received
to her posts or comments in the past. These endorsements summarize the influence of a user in a
community.
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Table 5.4: Features used to represent a message in a Reddit conversation.
Feature Domain

Structural Features

User Features

Content Features

Feature Description
Number of comments for comment/post
Adoption delay from the parent comment/post
Adoption delay from the root post/root
Level of the conversation tree
Birth order of comment
Number of comments for the parent comment/post
Birth order of the parent comment
Number of comments to the grandparent comment/post
Birth order of the grandparent comment
Total number comments received by the comment author in the past
Total netscore (upvotes−downvotes) of the comment author in the past
Total number comments made by comment author in the past
Netscore of the comment
Subjectivity score of the comment
Controversiality score of the comment
Netscore of the parent comment
Subjectivity score of the parent comment/ post
Controversiality score of the parent comment
Netscore of the grand parent comment
Subjectivity score of the grand parent comment/ post
Controversiality score of the grand parent comment

We extracted the sentiment scores of Reddit comments that quantify the subjective and
controversial content (a Python library of a natural language toolkit is used to calculate these two
features [188]). We also captured the semantic structure of the comments at predecessor nodes.
Another useful feature is the popularity of posts or comments that is captured by net-score, the
difference between up-votes and down-votes received for a particular post or comment from all users.

5.3

Evaluation
The primary objective of the generative model proposed in this study is to predict the com-

plete conversation structure with authors and timing information. For a comprehensive evaluation,
we compare the following outcomes against the ground truth conversations: (i) the structural char-
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Table 5.5: Reddit conversations grouped by post time.
Domain
Crypto
Cyber

Training (Jan ’15–Jul ’17)
# Conversations # Messages
0.19M
3.3M
1.7M
34M

Testing (Aug ’17)
# Conversations # Messages
0.02M
0.25M
0.06M
0.9M

acteristics in terms of size and virality of the predicted conversations; (ii) the volume as measured in
the number of comments generated to the seed posts and audience size as measured in the number
of distinct users who participate in the conversations over time, and (iii) the collective behavior of
users who engage in multiple conversations.
For testing the generated pools of conversations, we used a subset of the testing data as
follows. We used as seeds the posts made between August 1 and August 3, 2017, and the resulting
conversations as seen by the end of August 2017. There were 3,740 and, respectively, 3,463 such
conversations in the crypto-currency and cyber-security domains. Because seeds are chosen from a
continuous time interval, the ensuing conversations can overlap in time.
We compare the quality of our model with respect to three baseline models. First, we
use a state-of-the-art generative model (i.e., Lumbreras Model [131, 189]) that predicts the entire
structure of the conversation instead of aggregate metrics such as size or virality. The Lumbreras
model proposed an improved solution compared with a family of generative approaches [190, 191]
that use the branching process in the generation of conversation structures. A more recent work [135]
that adds reciprocity as a model parameter acknowledges increased computational costs relative to
previous work due to various optimization functions. Due to the size of our datasets, we chose to
compare with the less computationally intensive Lumbreras model. This model uses parameters
related to popularity, novelty (preference to reply to a newer post), root-bias (preference to reply
to a post rather than to a reply itself), and user roles to predict the growth of discussions. We
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construct 10 pools of conversations from this solution to account for the bias in parameter selection
criteria. However, this model does not assign user information and maps only discrete timestamps
to the generated comments. We do not use the Lumbreras model in the temporal measurements
due to the mismatch between our continuous time and its discrete time approaches.
Next, we use two baseline models that draw the events from the training data repeatedly into
the testing time period. Baseline (recent-replay) draws the most recent n conversations from the
training data. Baseline (random) draws n conversations from the training data at random (where
n is the number of seeds in the testing period). We construct 10 pools of conversations in the
Baseline (random) solution to minimize the bias of random selection. In the baseline solutions, we
keep all other event information (e.g., author, the conversation structure, etc.) of the conversations
except the event timestamps, which are shifted by the time interval between the seed post and their
corresponding root message. Because these baseline models repeat events from the recent past,
they proved to be very challenging to outperform in simulating user activities in multiple social
platforms [107, 106], including Reddit [128].
To evaluate the accuracy of our conversation reconstruction solution, we use several measurements. First, we evaluate the goodness of our fitness score used in the conversation reconstruction
algorithm (Section 5.3.1). Second, we present the structure of conversations in the reconstructed
pool with respect to size and virality (Section 5.3.2). Third, we evaluate the volume of messages
generated from the original posts with respect to the community of users who authored them and
timing information (Section 5.3.3). Finally, we quantify the engagement of users in multiple conversations (Section 5.3.4). These metrics are reported in comparison with ground-truth data and
the baseline models mentioned above.
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5.3.1 The Goodness Score of a Conversation
We measure the two components of the goodness score: predicting the position of a message
as a branch or leaf node in the conversation tree, and the timing of the message as early or late
compared to the median propagation delay relative to that conversation. We train four LSTM models in total for two training datasets as described in Table 5.5. The outputs of these LSTM models
are used to assess the likelihood of a conversation in the conversation reconstruction algorithm.
LSTM-degree models achieve a 73-75% F1 score in discriminating leaves vs. branching nodes in
respective domains. A majority vote would achieve 65% accuracy on predicting branches as the two
classes are balanced in the ratio of 65%:35% across both datasets. The F1 score of our LSTM-delay
models in distinguishing between early and late adopters is 83-89% while a random draw should
achieve 50% given the perfectly balanced classes.

5.3.2 The Structure of Conversations in the Pool
To measure the size and structural virality of the generated conversations irrespective of
the temporal aspects, we compare the re-constructed conversation pool with the baseline generative
approaches. We show the Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) of individual conversation sizes
and structural virality scores for conversations resulting from our model, the baseline approaches,
and the ground truth in Figure 5.5. For fairness in evaluating the baseline approach, for the
Lumbreras model and Baseline (random) we generated 10 solutions for each seed and reported the
average. We calculate the absolute percentage error (APE) of the mean size and the mean structural
virality between the generated conversations and the ground truth conversations. We also report
the JS divergence between the distributions of the structural metrics reported from the generative
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Figure 5.5: The distribution of the size and virality of conversations.
models and the ground truth (as shown in Table 5.6). A lower JS divergence value denotes that the
distribution of the sizes/structural virality of the generated conversations is closer to that of the
ground truth. We have three observations from these measurements.
First, our solution achieves the lowest JS divergence value after comparing the distributions
of sizes and virality scores between the predicted and the ground truth conversations (as shown in
Table 5.6). We also record the mean conversation size closer to the ground truth value across both
datasets as shown by the lowest APE values for sizes in Table 5.6.
Second, we noticed that the mean structural virality scores of the conversations generated
by our solution are closer to the ground truth in crypto-currency related discussions (lowest APE

101

Table 5.6: Performance of the size and structural virality of the conversations. We compare the
distribution of size and virality of the generated conversations with the ground truth using JS Divergence (JSD). We also report the APE for the mean size and structural virality of the conversations
after compared with the respective values in the ground truth. We highlight the lowest JSD and
APE values in bold.
Domain

Crypto

Cyber

Model
Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)
Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)

Size
JSD APE
0.40 51.7
0.14 43.5
0.49 37.4
0.15 25.4
0.39 28.9
0.41 57.6
0.34
12
0.23
8.6

Virality
JSD APE
0.043 17.6
0.074 23.7
0.046 11.8
0.012
7.5
0.035
14
0.036 62.7
0.062
0.3
0.029 15.7

values for virality in Table 5.6) more than the cyber-security related conversations. We believe
this is due to the slight over-prediction (12%-18%) of the number of smaller conversations (i.e.,
conversations with a size smaller than the median size) compared to what exists in the ground
truth. The majority of smaller conversations only have immediate comments to the original post,
thus the virality scores are very low.
And finally, we also notice the difficulty of accurately predicting the properties of the largest
and most viral conversations. Note that the most viral conversation may not be the largest conversation [180]. For example, the size of the most viral (virality = 12) conversation is 136, and the
virality of the largest conversation (size = 1,301) is 5 in crypto-currency discussions. We do not
accurately predict the size and virality of such conversations compared to other baseline models (as
shown in Table 5.7). However, we noticed those baseline models are not consistent in achieving the
best results across crypto and cyber discussions. These conversations are very rare to observe and
are likely to grow under external events [180, 192]. These external events may be in the form of
crypto-currency prices, cyber-security attacks, or news events as reported by journalists. Our prob-
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Table 5.7: Performance of the largest and the most viral conversations. We highlight the lowest
APE values in bold.
Domain

Crypto

Cyber

Model
Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)
Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)

Largest
Size (APE)
62
10
113
69
34
121
358
87

Most viral
Virality (APE)
17
83
0
8
21
147
53
47

abilistic model does not account for these external events on generating the conversation structure,
thus it is unable to reproduce the properties of the most viral conversation. We plan to incorporate
external events for modeling conversations in future work.
In conclusion, while our solution more accurately traces both the distribution of conversation
sizes and that of conversation viralities than any of the baselines, it struggles with the endpoints of
the spectrum: very small and very large conversation properties. However, we can conclude that we
generate a pool of conversations that are closer to forecasted activity than simply representing the
past through random sampling because in all metrics we consistently outperform the random and
recent-replay baselines. The challenges posed by the two baseline models extracted from training
data are evident also in comparison with the performance of the Lumbreras model: only once does
the Lumbreras model outperform both baselines in terms of JS distances (Table 5.6). In terms of
APE values (as presented in Table 5.6), it competes closely with the baselines.
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5.3.3 Temporal Conversations
We compare the reconstructed pool of conversations with the ground truth data on different
temporal measurements. We compare i) the size of the conversation pool as measured in the
overall number of comments generated to the seed posts, and ii) the number of distinct users who
participate in the conversation pool over time. We report Dynamic Time Warping (dtw) and Root
Mean Square Error (rmse) on these measurements between the conversations in the reconstructed
pool and the conversations in the ground truth. We use daily granularity to bin the timeseries for
comparison, and group these timeseries into five time intervals of 1–5 days, 5–7 days, 7–14 days,
14–21 days, and 21–28 days for a deeper evaluation.
Table 5.8 shows the APE values for the number of messages and the number of distinct users
after comparing different models with the ground truth. Our simulations result in better estimations
of the total number of messages than any of the baselines, with 25.3 and 8.5 absolute percentage
error (APE) in the two datasets, which leads to 35%-50% performance gain over the best-performing
baseline. However, our solution does not achieve the lowest APE on the total number of distinct
users as we over-predict the number of users who participate in these conversations.
Table 5.8: Performance of the volume and users in the conversation pool. We do not report the
number of distinct users for the Lumbreras Model as it does not predict user assignments. We
highlight the lowest APE values in bold.

Crypto

Cyber

Model
Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)
Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)

# Messages (APE)
52
50
37
25
29
58
11
8

# Users (APE)
29
22
36
2
27
67
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We are interested, however, in evaluating our predictions over the simulated time. This
is particularly relevant for application scenarios such as designing intervention techniques when
one would like to investigate "what if" scenarios and their consequences at particular times. Figures 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 report the timeseries and the performance of predicting the volume of comments
and the number of distinct users who participate in these conversations. There are multiple observations to be made from these plots. First, the trend of the number of messages and distinct
users over time holds for our simulations and the baselines. This is because all models capture the
intuitive phenomenon of high activity and user involvement when a post is freshly made, and the
decay in interest as time passes.
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Figure 5.6: The conversation pool over time. We report the size of the conversation pool and
the number of unique users participating in conversations over time for crypto-currency and cybersecurity discussions. Genetic-LSTM (our solution) is compared with two competing baseline models,
Baseline (recent-replay) and Baseline (random). Baseline (random) predictions are normalized over
10 different runs, and the error bars are reported for the standard deviation.
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Second, our solution fares better than the baselines not only in the aggregate number of
messages at the end of the simulation period but also over time: the green lines in Figures 5.6a
and 5.6b are generally the closest to the ground truth plots in yellow. As shown in Figure 5.7c, our
solution records a rmse value of 1,685 compared to the rmse values of 3,697 and 3,329 for the two
baseline models on predicting the conversation pool size during the first five days (1D-5D). During
the next time intervals, our solution records 2%-39% performance benefit in rmse values over both
datasets compared to the best-performed baseline solution (as shown in Figures 5.7c and 5.7d).
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Figure 5.7: The size of conversation pool over time. We report the performance of predicting the
size of the conversation pool over time for crypto-currency and cyber-security discussions using two
quantitative metrics, (a,b) Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) (lower is better), (c,d) RMSE values
(lower is better) after comparing each model predictions with the ground truth over different time
intervals. Checkpoint windows are in days (D).
Third, our performance advantage over the baselines is higher in the cyber-security conversations, where our solution is always better than both baselines in both rmse and dtw measurements
for all interval periods shown in Figures 5.7b, and 5.7d. This is probably due to the significantly

106

larger dataset in cyber-security which is 10x larger than the crypto-currency dataset. A larger
dataset generally helps our machine learning models to train and make better predictions. In general, our improved performance over baselines is likely due to incorporating original post information
in generating the conversations and optimizing branching factor and propagation delay in the predicted pool of conversations. The baseline models do not account for such attributes but only replay
the past events.
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Figure 5.8: The number of unique users over time. We report the performance of predicting the
number of unique users over time for crypto-currency and cyber-security discussions using two
quantitative metrics, (a,b) Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) (lower is better), (c,d) RMSE values
(lower is better) after comparing each model predictions with the ground truth over different time
intervals. Checkpoint windows are in days (D).
And finally, our model performs better than the baselines in the number of users engaged
over time in these conversations. For Reddit-like conversations, this is a challenge since discussions
may lead to provocative, offensive, or menacing comments that end up repeatedly involving a subgroup of users [132]. For example, there are only 6,818 users who participate in 32,533 comments in
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crypto-currency discussions. In the largest conversation, the ratio between the number of comments
and the number of users is 2.35 in the ground truth, and 2.06 in our solution. Our model tends
to over-predict the number of users engaged a short time after the seed messages are posted (as
shown in Figures 5.8c and 5.8d for the interval 1D–5D), and consistently performs well for the more
distant future. As shown in Figures 5.8a - 5.8d, our solution achieves the lowest DTW and RMSE
values for the interval 5D–7D across two datasets, respectively. This is particularly relevant because
it shows our model’s predictive power for longer-term simulations: from the 6th to the 28th day of
the simulation period, our model consistently predicts better the number of users and the timing of
their comments.

5.3.4 Collective Behavior
Another important characteristic related to user engagement is the co-engagement with
various topics. Specifically, empirical studies [193] have shown coordinated campaigns run as troll
farms or cyborgs, where groups of users engage in multiple related conversations to shift the opinion
of the general audience.
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Figure 5.9: The number of users who engaged with conversations. We show the comparison with
the baseline models. The values in the y-axis are binned by the intervals of 10 in the x-axis.
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We report two measurements to capture the collective behavior of users who participate in
these conversations. First, we present the number of users engaged in multiple conversations (as
shown in Figures 5.9a and 5.9b). Specifically, we record the number of conversations that a user
engaged with, and count the users who engaged with X number of conversations (1 ≤ X ≤ 3740).
We noticed a heavy-tailed distribution, where few users engage in many conversations. We calculate
the JS divergence between each models’ distribution and the ground truth distribution. Lower JS
divergence values reflect predictions closer to the number of actively engaged users observed in the
ground truth.
Our solution achieves the lowest JSD value of 0.05 (crypto) and 0.07 (cyber) after comparing
with the respective baseline models. We also predict the number of highly active users closer to the
ground truth value than any other baseline solution. In the crypto-currency discussions, we predict
1,916 users who engage with more than two conversations, while there are 2,438 such users in the
ground truth and 1,310 such users in the best-performing baseline solution. Our relative success
is due to implicitly accounting for simultaneous conversations with possibly common users in our
modeling of the problem as a pool of conversations. Specifically, our LSTM-based model that helps
to select the best pool of conversations accounts for user participation in multiple conversations,
thus is able to predict better the number of highly engaged users than a model that simply repeats
the past.
Second, we evaluate whether users participate in these conversations as a group according
to a metric (collectivity) proposed by [181]. We record user participation in conversations in
a vector [c1 , c2 , ..., cn ], where ci indicates a binary value to reflect the user involvement in the
ith conversation. For this metric, we only consider the most active users who participate in at
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least three conversations (on average, a user participates in two conversations in the ground truth
dataset). The original paper [181] used the Pearson correlation coefficient to compare all pairs of
binary vectors. The higher the correlation coefficient values, two users participate in the same set
of conversations. They also used the Jaccard coefficient to compare the overlap of conversations
between two users. According to their experiments, the Pearson correlation coefficient and Jaccard
coefficient values are correlated. While we do not experiment with any other similarity metric (e.g.,
Hamming distance), we believe they would result in distributions similar to what was observed
using the Pearson correlation coefficient or the Jaccard coefficient. In this work, we use the Pearson
correlation coefficient to quantify the collective behavior of user involvements.
We calculate the JS-divergence and RMSE between the coefficient distributions of the simulation and the ground truth data (as shown in Table 5.9). Lower JS-divergence values reflect
collective behavior closer to that measured from the ground truth. We achieve the lowest 0.07 and
0.12 JS-divergence values, and lowest 1,815 and 976 rmse values for the respective domains after
compared with the respective baseline models.
Table 5.9: A comparison of the collectivity scores. We report the collectivity scores of users who participate in multiple conversations. We show JS-divergence (JSD) and RMSE values after comparing
each models’ distributions of collectivity scores with the ground truth values. We do not report the
number of these measurements for the Lumbreras Model as it does not predict user assignments.
We highlight the lowest JSD and RMSE values in bold.
Model

Crypto

Cyber

Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)
Baseline (recent-replay)
Baseline (random)
Lumbreras Model
Genetic-LSTM (our solution)

Collectivity
JSD RMSE
0.09
8036
0.14
8210
0.07
1815
0.12
1779
0.23
3049
0.12
976
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In summary, our experimental results show that in addition to accurately predicting the
structural properties of individual conversations, predicting pools of conversations also leads to
more accurate predictions of user involvement over time.

5.4

Summary and Discussion
This chapter introduces a generative technique for predicting a group of simultaneous con-

versations in social media. Our solution uses a probabilistic generative model with the support of a
genetic algorithm and LSTM neural networks. We tested our technique on two topic-based collections of Reddit conversation trees. Given a set of posts in a continuous time interval, our solution
generates the full set of reactions to each message, including reactions to reactions, without having
access to, for example, intermediate states of the conversation tree. In addition to generating the
structure of conversation trees, our solution also assigns authorship and timing information to each
message. The code for this framework is available publicly [194].
Our solution captures the relationship between different microscopic conversation properties
including the structure, propagation speed (timing), and the users who participate in a set of simultaneous conversations. We trained two LSTM models on pools of conversations to capture this
relationship. In the first model, we predict whether a node in the conversation is branching (thus,
generating more reactions) or is a leaf in the conversation tree. The second model classifies messages
by the delay which they are posted in response to their parent. Both models use structural, user,
and content features in the temporal space. While structural and content-level features represent
the characteristics of individual conversations, the user-level features capture the characteristics of
users who participate in simultaneous conversations. In the genetic algorithm, we assess the likeli-
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hood of a user’s action in a conversation based on the output of these two machine-learning models.
Experimental results show that this technique can generate accurate conversation topological structures over time, and can accurately predict the volume of messages and the engagement of users
over time.
We show the effectiveness of our approach on two groups of highly related communities:
nine subreddits focused on crypto-currencies and 38 subreddits focused on cyber-security topics.
The prediction of user involvement over different simultaneous conversations can also be used by
community organizers to control the focused discussions or to promote positive community norms.
Our solution has a number of limitations. One is that in evaluating the generated conversation trees, our model arbitrarily maps the content-level features from a distribution built from
training data. In an ideal scenario, we should predict the attributes of the comments (e.g., polarity,
subjectivity) to draw these features accurately. Moreover, a rich set of content-level features to capture humor, adversity, emotions, etc. could be developed to improve the machine-learning models.
Another limitation is that our approach tends to repeat in predicting the user interactions seen in
the training data. A better approach would use information about the users who have been exposed
to a message and thus may be candidates for responding. However, this true diffusion structure is
hidden and inferring it is difficult [195].
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Chapter 6: Simulating Twitter Activity Using Exogenous Signals4

Social media platforms provide a virtual space for online communication, and they often
get influenced by what happens in the outside world. These external factors can be independent
of what is recorded on a social media platform, and most often related to environment, policy,
or culture [13]. For example, Twitter users react spontaneously during natural disasters (e.g.,
the 2010 Haiti Earthquake [196], Hurricane Irma [197]). There are various cultural habits that
influence online communication patterns [198]. Some policy decisions such as deplatforming [199]
or content moderation [200] can shape social media communication. However, the influence from
these external events can not be easily measured (or decoupled from other factors), or explicitly
controlled. Distilling these various external forces is key to improving the general understanding of
information dissemination in social media platforms.
One of our driving hypotheses is that taking external events into consideration may result in
better predictions of user activity on a social media platform. Can one accurately generate the social
media activity on a platform (for example, Twitter) using the recorded signals from other platforms?
More importantly, is that doable in the context of unexpected events, when social media users both
react to unexpected news in unpredictable ways and also generate news for many news outlets? Our
objective is to predict Twitter activity with the help of exogenous sources (as shown in Figure 6.1).
Our predictions include when a Twitter message is posted, what it is about (topic), who tweeted the
message, and who retweeted that message (as described in Section 4.2). This finer granularity of
4

A part of this chapter was previously published in [4]. Permission is included in Appendix A.
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Figure 6.1: Predicting Twitter topic activity using exogenous data.
simulated activity makes the problem more difficult than simply predicting the overall daily volume
of activity.
We focus on simulating an interval of two weeks at daily granularity. That means that, unlike
most machine learning-based approaches that try to predict the next data point, we are predicting
the activity of day d without having the ground truth of the activity on day d − 1. We predict
Twitter activity around Venezuela’s latest political crisis from January 2019 to the end of February
2019. By their nature, periods of crisis do not include many repeatable events, thus it is difficult to
learn and predict how social media users will react to a first refusal of international humanitarian
aid, for example, or to a second round of violence against street protesters. As exogenous data, we
mine news articles and the Venezuela-related subreddit, /r/vzla. The contributions of this chapter
are the following:
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• We present the design of a simulator that can mimic the peaks of real activity. The successful
design includes modularization in order to specialize predictions to particular sub-problems,
such as the prediction of the number of information cascades and the prediction of the size
and growth of these cascades.
• We show that predictions using current day exogenous data work better than models that use
previous day exogenous data. We push boundaries by questioning the accepted practice of
using historical information from before midnight. We make the case that social media users
react rapidly to news and live events, so the past is sometimes just 30 seconds ago.
• We discuss how different sources of exogenous data are beneficial for different topics that are
part of the same large conversation.
This chapter is organized as follows. First, we present the simulator design and implementation in Section 6.1. Second, we describe the datasets that we use for the evaluation in Section 6.2.
Third, Section 6.3 reports the simulation performance in various metrics of interest. And finally,
Section 6.4 concludes with a discussion of our contributions.

6.1

Simulator Design and Implementation
Twitter users often engaged with a variety of topics over time and their reactions are often

influenced by external events [192, 201]. Thus, simulating Twitter activity requires the use of signals
of real-life events from exogenous data sources.
This section presents the design of a social simulator that accurately predicts Twitter activity
with the help of exogenous data. Our goal is to predict two weeks of Twitter activity without any
knowledge of the ground-truth Twitter activity during that period. The predicted Twitter activity
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should be described by the type of action (tweet or retweet), topic, author, and the timestamp of
the message.

6.1.1 Modular Design
Our design contains two modules, as shown in Figure 6.2. The Seed Module takes the
historical activities in Twitter and other platforms as inputs and predicts the daily number of
tweets (that we refer to as seed events) for each topic (Section 6.1.2). Second, the Cascade Module
takes as input the outputs of Seed Module and generates retweet cascades in response to the seed
events (Section 6.1.3). This module is similar to the solution proposed in the previous chapter
(Section 5.1.1) but extends to predict Twitter information cascades. Each message in the retweet
cascades is predicted with the user who posts the retweet and the day of the retweet.

Figure 6.2: Overview of the proposed simulator design.

6.1.2 Seed Prediction Module
During our many iterations over the design of the simulator on different datasets, we noticed
that correctly predicting the daily volume of tweets sets the tone for more accurate simulations. We
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thus ended up designing a specialized module that is in charge of the task of predicting the number
of tweets per day for the duration of the forecasting window. In addition, this module also assigns
to each tweet the user who authored it.
We first attempted to predict the overall volume of tweets and then split it into topics. It
turned out that accurately predicting the daily fraction of tweets that belong to a topic potentially
informed or drowned out by unpredictable events such as mass protests, military interventions, or
declarations of international support was challenging. We thus decided to directly predict the daily
number of tweets per topic.
We implemented this module using machine learning. We trained a neural network on
Twitter historical activity (expressed as a number of tweets per day) and its contemporary exogenous
data signal. Given the exogenous events of day d from the forecasting window, the trained algorithm
predicts the number of tweets from day d + 1. We also experimented with using Twitter activity in
day d to predict the Twitter activity of day d + 1. This approach required us to use the predicted
Twitter activity of days 2, 3, etc. of the forecasting window as input for the following day predictions
since by problem definition we did not have the ground-truth Twitter data. This solution ends up
compounding errors, and thus the accuracy drops over time. Moreover, this approach failed to
predict bursts of activity that are evident in the ground truth. This is what prompted us to use
only the volume of exogenous activity to predict Twitter activity.
For training, we built a feature vector that represents the topic as a one-hot encoding vector
and the number of exogenous events related to that topic in a given day d. Exogenous features are
the daily number of news articles and the daily number of Reddit messages related to the topic.
Note that we can combine the exogenous sources or treat them separately. We experimented with
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all versions, but for brevity, we will present experiments with only two, the news only and Reddit
only. The target variable is the number of tweets related to a topic in the day d + 1. For training, we
identify the best hyperparameters using 5-fold cross-validation. We ended up with a neural network
of 3 hidden layers with the sizes of 15, 10, and 5 neurons. We used the Adam optimizer and the
mean squared error loss function.
We assigned users to the predicted tweets randomly with probability proportional to the
user spread score [202]. Higher spread scores indicate that the identified users have more potential
to spread the information. While this heuristic is not optimal, it captures the activity of influential
users better than other heuristics that we considered, such as the number of tweets or the number
of followers.

6.1.3 Cascade Generation Module
We use this module to generate the retweet trees (information cascades) in response to
predicted tweets. We chose this approach in order to provide fine-granular predictions that can
mimic user activity patterns, not only volume.
Twitter information cascades consist of a collection of retweets originated from an original
tweet. While the original tweet and retweet messages are labeled with the user and timing information, the Twitter API does not provide whether the retweet is in response to another retweet [203].
Due to this limitation, we can only construct the chain of retweets from ordering the retweet messages by the timestamp. This would construct a retweet star where all the retweets are connected
to the original tweet. However, this is not realistic as most often users retweet other user’s retweets
instead of the original tweet [180]. Different techniques are built to approximate the true retweet
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tree [203]. We reconstruct the retweet tree using the time-inferred diffusion algorithm [110]. This
technique connects a retweet with a previous retweet/tweet utilizing the Twitter follower network.
We use the same probabilistic approach as discussed in the previous chapter (Section 5.1.1)
to generate the cascade structure with users and timestamps. After this procedure, we end up with
cascade trees rooted in an original tweet in which each node has a user and a time assigned. However,
we do not proceed with the optimization step used in the previous solution. This optimization step
requires the output of two machine learning models that use the features for the users who posted
the messages. These users appear in both training and testing data, thus allowing the model to
make predictions based on their history. But we noticed that new users make up the majority of
the Twitter population. Due to this limitation, we rely on a separate sub-module that predicts the
daily rate of newly engaged users to inform the cascade generation process.
In this sub-module, we rely on the same feature vectors as used before in the seed module,
and construct two sets of training examples depending on the exogenous source (in our case, news
articles and posts on Reddit) that we select to extract features. We trained one neural network for
each set of training examples, and used the trained neural networks to predict the daily number of
newly engaged users for each topic. Similar to the seed module, we used the exogenous events on
the day before the predictions.
We assign new users to the cascades as follows. We select leaves of the cascades predicted
for each topic and assign those users a completely new and unique identifier. This approach is due
to our observation that the majority of new users participate in the cascades as leaf nodes (i.e.,
they retweet the original tweet or another retweet, but their retweets are not reshared back). This
process is repeated until we match the daily number of new users predicted.
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6.2

Datasets
For the last two decades, the Venezuelan society has experienced a pervasive sociopolitical

fragmentation fueled by differences of interests, identities, and politics. In Venezuela, the political
spectrum is for the most part divided into two parties: Chavism, those who support the political
ideology of the late president Hugo Chavez, and Anti-Chavism, those strongly opposed to Chavez’s
legacy. Today Chavism still maintains control of the Venezuelan political system with Nicolas
Maduro as the head of state. However, failure to manage globalization, lack of investment in
infrastructure, and a poor administration have put the country in the grip of a significant economic
collapse. As a result, it has contributed to a significant rise in crime and violence, lack of essentials,
shortages of medicines and food, and an unprecedented humanitarian crisis.

6.2.1 Venezuela Political Crisis Events
For this study, we focus on data specific to on-the-ground events in Venezuela developing in
early 2019. These events highlight a period of high political tension which resulted in nationwide
protests, militarized responses, and incidents of mass violence and arrests. Figure 6.3 shows a
summarized timeline of the political events described below.
The 2019 Venezuelan political crisis has its roots in the controversial re-election of Nicolas
Maduro as the country’s president on January 10th. The event marked the beginning of a presidential crisis driven by claims of illegitimacy and reports of coercion and fraud. During the following
days, the opposition-controlled National Assembly widely denounced the re-election as fraudulent
and mandated an order of succession. On January 23, the opposition leader, Juan Guaidó, declared
himself interim president of Venezuela in an effort to restore democracy and constitutional rights.
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The event erupted widespread protests to put pressure on Maduro’s administration to resign from
office, and it formed a coalition of countries in support of Guaidó. In response to this, Maduro’s
government ordered the armed forces into the streets to maintain social order and disperse mass
protests. These intense and violent clashes between the military and opposition supporters continued during the first couple of weeks of February and resulted in massive lootings, a large number
of detentions, and dozens of injured.
On February 2, Guaidó announced a plan together with an international coalition to bring
humanitarian aid into Venezuela on February 23. At the same time, Maduro rejected international
aid offers and ordered the immediate closure of the Brazilian and Colombian borders to impede its
delivery. A day before the international aid delivery, two dueling concerts took place simultaneously
at the Colombia-Venezuela border. The "Aid Live" concert was organized with the purpose to help
raise money and support for the international humanitarian aid effort. On the other hand, Maduro’s
government organised the "Hands Off Venezuela" concert to counteract the rival concert and reject
aid efforts. On February 23, the plan to bring humanitarian aid into Venezuela was met with a
violent standoff between military forces and those accompanying the aid. Clashes continued to run
rampant over the next couple of days, and eventually, it was reported that none of the aid shipments
were able to enter the country.

6.2.2 Data Collection and Processing
In this section, we describe the Twitter dataset covering the Venezuelan political crisis,
exogenous data sources, and other data preprocessing and enrichment steps in detail.
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Figure 6.3: Timeline of Venezuela political events. We also show the timeseries of Twitter messages
for 12 topics in our dataset. The box represents the testing period for our simulator (February
15—February 28, 2019).
6.2.2.1

Twitter Data
The Twitter data was collected over a period of two months (January 1st to February 28th,

2019) using GNIP, a data collection API tool, and based on a list of keywords relevant to the
Venezuelan political crisis. Table 6.1 presents the complete list of keywords for data collection. The
resulting dataset consists of 1,104,175 seed messages including tweets, replies, and quotes done by
273,392 users, and 11,681,723 retweets by 889,139 users. The majority of messages are in Spanish
(86%) and English (6%). We note that user identities are anonymized in this dataset. Each Twitter
record in our dataset contains the following information: an assigned unique identifier, the unique
(anonymized) ID of the user who posted it, the timestamp of the message, the respective content
of the message, and its type (whether a tweet, quote, reply or retweet). This dataset was provided
privately as part of DARPA SocialSim program.
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Table 6.1: Keywords used for data collection.
#23Ene, #23Feb, 23 de Enero, 23 de Febrero, Aid Venezuela, #BravoPueblo, Caracas,
Maturin, Maracaibo, #Chavismo, #Chavistas, FANB, #FreeVenezuela, #FueraDictadura,
Fuerza Venezuela, GNB, #GritemosConBrio, #GuaidoPresidente, #JGuaido, Juan Guaido,
#LasCallesSonDelChavismo, Leales siempre traidores nunca, Libertad para Venezuela,
Freedom for Venezuela, #VamosBien, #MaduroDictador, #MaduroUsurpador, Nicolas
Maduro, #SOSVenezuela, #VenezolanosEnElMundo, Venezuela Aid Live, #WeAreMaduro,
Yankee go Home, #HandsOffVenezuela, #FebreroRebelde, #NoMasDictadura, Maduro,
#AbajoCadenas, Venezuela Crisis Humanitaria, Maduro Ilegitimo, Guaido, Chacao
In order to annotate Twitter messages with topics, we worked alongside three research collaborators, who are subject-matter experts regarding the Venezuelan political context. The annotators
are fluent in both English and Spanish, and also familiar with particular jargon and specialized
terms commonly used in Venezuela. We conducted a thorough exploration of our dataset corpus
in order to identify the most representative topics originating from online social media discussions.
Our initial attempt at topic assignment resulted in the identification of 10 top-level topic groups:
Guaidó, Assembly, Maduro, protests, arrests, violence, international, military, crisis, and others.
While some of these top-level topics express important information on their own (e.g., protests,
arrests), others have no well-defined meaning or are too vague on their own (e.g., international).
Hence, some top-level topics were further extended to account for more informative and detailed
semantic topic groups. For example, the international topic was broken down into other sub-topics
(e.g., international/aid and international/aid_rejected). These sub-topics are more focused and
make explicit reference to specific on-the-ground events unfolding in Venezuela. Overall, this effort resulted in a total of 49 sub-topics. Practically, it is not feasible to manually label millions of
messages. So, in order to automate the annotation process, we conducted a semi-supervised classification task consisting of two steps: (1) manually annotating an initial subset of messages, and (2)
training a multilingual BERT model to classify each message with one or multiple such sub-topics.
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The manual annotation process was conducted over a corpus of 11,218 messages and consisted of an 8 to 1 ratio of single-annotator annotations to all-annotator annotations. That is, for
every 8 messages annotated by each annotator individually, there is one message that all annotate.
Periodically, we calculated the inter-annotator agreement given by Cohen’s Kappa and Fleiss’ Kappa
scores. This process allows us to identify and ignore topics with low reliability and quality. Particularly, we narrowed down our initial 49 topics to the following 12 topics: international/aid, military,
violence, guaido/legitimate, maduro/dictator, international/aid_rejected, protests, other/chavez,
maduro/legitimate, arrests, other/chavez/anti, and maduro/narco. These 12 topics reported interannotator agreement scores of 0.64 for the weighted average Cohen’s Kappa, and 0.7 for the Fleiss’
Kappa measurement. Previous work has also found similar Cohen’s Kappa agreement scores in a
variety of datasets [204].
After manual annotation, we trained a BERT model for topic annotation. Previous works
have found great success using BERT for multilingual text classification tasks [205]. Hence, in this
study, BERT is preferable since our dataset consists of a mix of multiple languages. The BERT
model was trained on 10,097 unique text documents and evaluated on a 10% test set (1,121 texts).
We used stratified sampling to ensure that the train and test sets have approximately the same
percentage of samples of each topic class as in the original manually annotated corpus. The model
obtained a precision of 67%, recall of 66%, and F1 score of 66%.

6.2.2.2

Exogenous Data
In order to evaluate the interplay between Twitter activity and the different signals from

contemporary exogenous data, we collected data from Reddit as well as mined news articles relevant to the Venezuela political crisis. We collected discussions structured around one of the largest
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Venezuela-related subreddits, /r/vzla. The subreddit Venezuela community often engages in political discussions about the political spectrum in the country, which most likely are not going to
be covered in conventional news outlets. Hence, it offers a different perspective about the ongoing
political crisis in Venezuela and may provide useful signals to predict online activity on other platforms. The Reddit data was collected via the publicly available Reddit API. A query against the
period of January 1 to February 28, 2019 returned a total of 4,933 posts and 51,136 comments done
by 3,220 users. The corresponding text content on posts and comments and the timestamp of the
postings were also collected.
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Figure 6.4: Timeseries of tweets, news articles, and Reddit messages.

The news article data was collected via a publicly available geopolitical event database,
GDELT [206]. The database consists of machine-coded events extracted from news reports on a
variety of news sources. The GDELT database is updated from the news articles published every 15
minutes intervals. We queried the database using the "Venezuela" search term between January 1
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and February 28, 2019. This returned a total of 138,009 source URLs, where the Venezuela keyword
occurs anywhere in the content of the document. We also gathered the source text for each article
and the date when it was published. We used the article reference time in GDELT to retrieve the
hour of publication.
We assigned topics to exogenous data by running the previously pre-trained BERT model
over the content of news articles and Reddit messages. We randomly sampled 500 Reddit posts and
news articles to measure the reliability of this classification. We were only able to find 5% false
positives. This results in a total of 2,021 posts and 31,295 comments on Reddit, and 81,887 news
articles to be associated with at least one topic of interest. Figure 6.4 shows the hourly activities
of Twitter and respective exogenous sources.

6.3

Evaluation
We measured the accuracy of the generated Twitter activity per topic by comparing it

against ground truth and against two baselines. We report performance using three metrics: (i) the
daily activity volume as represented by the number of tweets and retweets, (ii) the number of newly
engaged users every day, and (iii) the page rank distribution of the user interaction network.
Due to the complexity of our prediction problem (e.g., who responds to whom in which topic,
and when), comparing our solution with other related work is not straightforward. We compare our
solution with two baselines extracted from training data. The first baseline, Replay, simply repeats
all events from the past two weeks. Thus, the only change is in the timestamps of the events
and there are no new users (since every user was also active exactly two weeks before in the same
topics). The second baseline, Sampling, draws full Twitter cascades at random to match the average
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daily volume of activity per topic observed in the last two weeks of training data. Thus, while this
sampling ignores the variations in volume from one day to another (see the corresponding flat line
in Figure 6.6), it aims to approximate the overall volume of shares over a 2-week period. Because
these baseline models repeat events from the recent past, they are very challenging to outperform
in simulating user activities in multiple social platforms, as shown in [107].

6.3.1 Predicting the Number of Shares
Predicting the number of shares for each topic is challenging because of burstiness and because different topics dominate at different times [148]. For example, the two big spikes in Twitter
activities during the last two weeks of February (Figure 6.3) are mainly due to the Venezuelan Aid
Live concert on February 22, and the violent standoff between military forces and those accompanying the aid and protesting against the regime on February 23. While the spike on February 22
was dominated by activities related to international/aid topic, the spike on February 23 was due
to three topics popular that day: military, violence, and protests. This is where exogenous data
(especially extracted from news reports) can be valuable for capturing the variations in popularity
of Twitter topics over time.
We evaluated our solution on predicting the number of tweets per day per topic during
the forecasting period. Figure 6.4 shows that the GDELT exogenous data precedes Twitter (and
Reddit) activity. This observation suggests, on one hand, that Twitter reacts very quickly to the
peak of news as recorded in GDELT; on the other hand, there are few updates after about 8 am in
GDELT. Reddit discussions are quite spread out over the day, but many comments in our dataset
are posted in late afternoon.
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We thus tested three scenarios corresponding to the time of the exogenous data. First,
exogenous features are from the day of predictions. This scenario is realistic in the context of filling
in gaps of data from the past (thus, the events as recorded in exogenous data already happened).
The second scenario assumes that the exogenous data are from the previous day. This scenario
holds even for the context in which our Twitter activity generator predicts the future based on a
recent past. The third scenario corresponds to the assumption that exogenous data is from the
past, but we roll the day from 8 am to 8 am, in order to catch the peak of activity in GDELT, thus
challenging the common practice of delimiting days at midnight. This scenario allows for a shorter
delay between the GDELT peak of events and the start of the daily Twitter activity patterns, yet
is realistic for both predicting future activities and generating past activity. For each scenario we
extracted the corresponding features and trained three neural networks.
We report the accuracy of predicted daily volume of activity by two metrics: normalized
root mean squared error (NRMSE) and symmetric mean absolute percentage error (SMAPE). For
NRMSE, we take the normalized cumulative values in the prediction and ground truth vectors
to calculate the root mean squared error. While NRMSE is scale-independent and evaluates the
temporal patterns of two time series, SMAPE accounts for the scale of the error.
Figures 6.5a and 6.5b show the performance of predicting the volume of tweets over time
for the 12 topics. We note the following. First, multiple variants of our solution capture the trend
of the number of tweets closer to the ground truth than any baselines for most of the topics. As
reported in Figure 6.5a, all the variants of our solution perform better than the baselines in NRMSE
for all topics. More importantly, we predict the big spikes in the number of tweets for most of the
popular topics (as shown in Figures 6.6a and 6.6b). While the Replay baseline predicts some spikes,
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Figure 6.5: Model performance of predicting tweets over time. We also report the performance of
MCAS (News 8-8") and MCAS (Reddit 8-8") that use the respective exogenous features from the
last 24 hours before 8 a.m. each day to predict the tweets in the next 24 hours.
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they are not timed similarly with the spikes in the ground truth, clearly making the point that
contemporary exogenous data is necessary for accurate forecasting.
Second, our solution fares better than the baselines not only in trend, but also in the actual
volume of tweets over time. As shown in Figure 6.5b, our solutions perform better for all topics
except for arrests. For the most popular topic (international/aid ), the minimum SMAPE is 61,
while Replay baseline records a SMAPE value of 99. Our worst performance is for the arrests topic,
where our solution failed to accurately predict the scale of multiple spikes. We noticed that the
spikes in arrests are not correlated between Twitter and other exogenous platforms. This might be
due to the emotional response in Twitter for the discussions related to the arrests topic that might
not be timely captured in the news articles or Reddit messages.
Third, out of the two models that use the current day exogenous features, the model that
used only Reddit features predicts the trend of tweets better than the model that used only news
features in all topics except for international/aid (as shown in Figure 6.5a). We noticed the online
community in Reddit who often engage in political discussions may provide a different perspective
about the on-going political crisis than what is usually covered in the news articles. These external
signals that originated from Reddit are helpful to predict the trends of activities on Twitter for
many topics. The exception in the performance of the topic international/aid might be due to the
timely coverage of the humanitarian aid effort in news articles.
Fourth, as expected, using current day exogenous data leads to more accurate predictions
than using the previous day exogenous data. As shown in Figures 6.5a and 6.5b, the model that
uses the current day exogenous features records lower NRMSE and SMAPE values than the models
that used the previous day exogenous features for most of the topics. We noticed the models that
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Figure 6.6: The number of tweets per topic. MCAS (News) and MCAS (Reddit) models use
the respective exogenous features from the day of predictions, while MCAS (News") and MCAS
(Reddit") models use the respective exogenous features from the day before the predictions. We
only visualize the time series for the two most popular topics to reduce visualization clutter.
use the news articles in the last 24 hours before 8 a.m. perform better on predicting the trend of
tweets than the models that use the news articles in the previous day of predictions (as shown in
Figure 6.5a). This might be due to the particularity of the GDELT database, where the majority
of news records were published around 5-6 am (as shown in Figure 6.4).
We also compare the volume of total shares on the same metrics between the prediction
and ground truth. While the seed module (Section 6.1.2) is responsible for predicting the number
of tweets and thus the number of information cascades, the size and growth of these cascades (i.e.,
retweets over time) are predicted by the cascade module (Section 6.1.3). To maintain consistency
across our different modules, we also generate retweets for the tweets predicted by different variants
of the seed module, but only report the performance for four variants to reduce the visual clutter.
Figures 6.7a, 6.7b, and 6.7c show the performance of predicting the volume of total tweets and
retweets for the 12 topics. We have two main observations.
First, similar to the performance of the seed module, the cascade module also captures the
trend of number of shares closer to the ground truth than any baselines for most of the topics. We
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Figure 6.7: Overview of the accuracy in forecasting Twitter activity. We report performance in
five metrics (shown along the x axis) after compared with ground-truth data: daily number of
tweets/retweets over time (#S) as measured by NRMSE and SMAPE, daily number of newly
engaged users over time (#NU) as measured by NRMSE and SMAPE, and page rank distribution
(PR) of the user interaction network as measured by Earth Movers (EM) distance metric. The
colors of the cell represent comparison with the baselines: the darkest shows better performance
than both baselines, the non-colored shows lower performance than both baselines. MCAS (News
8-8") uses the respective exogenous features from the last 24 hours before 8 a.m. each day to
predict the tweets in the next 24 hours. MCAS-GT-Seed uses the ground truth tweets to generate
retweets.
noticed the temporal pattern of total shares is driven mostly by the temporal pattern of tweets
predicted by the seed module.
Second, our solution captures the volume of shares over time for most popular topics (as
shown in Figures 6.8a and 6.8b) except international/aid-rejected, maduro/legitimate and arrests
(as shown in Figures 6.7a and 6.7b). While we predict the number of tweets using a learning
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Figure 6.8: The number of shares (tweets and retweets) per topic. MCAS (News) and MCAS
(Reddit) models use the predicted tweets from the respective exogenous features, and MCAS-GTSeed uses the the ground truth tweets to generate retweets. We only visualize the time series for
the two most popular topics due to space constraints.
algorithm, the number of retweets is the output of a generative algorithm. Thus, we expected
that prediction errors in the seed module carry over to the predictions in the cascade module. For
example, the lowest performing topics in the seed module (international/aid_rejected, arrests) is
the lowest performing in the cascade module as well.
In order to separate the errors from the seed module (predicting tweets) and the cascade
module (predicting retweets based on input tweets), we include in our evaluation the unrealistic
scenario when the tweets from the ground truth data are given as input to the cascade module. As
expected, we predict the volume of retweets more accurately when the cascade module used the
ground truth tweets (as shown in Figure 6.7d).

6.3.2 Predicting User Engagement
While our solution assigns a user identity (whether previously seen in the training data or
not) to each tweet and retweet, we do not attempt to predict exactly what user will post when and
on what topic. However, we evaluate the accuracy of user assignments by comparing the rate of
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newly engaged users, and the user interaction with the ground truth. This is particularly relevant
for application scenarios such as designing network intervention techniques, when one would like
to investigate "what if" scenarios (e.g., blocking some user accounts) and their consequences at
particular times.
First, we report the predicted number of new users per day compared with ground truth
data in the same two metrics as before, NRMSE and SMAPE. Figures 6.7a and 6.7b show that
our models outperform the respective baselines across all 12 topics with respect to NRMSE and
SMAPE. We also found that the performance of our solutions varies based on the topic of interest.
For instance, models using only Reddit features show better performance than those using only news
in other/chavez and maduro/narco topics, as shown in Figure 6.7b. On the other hand, models using
news features seem to do slightly better in the violence and international/aid_rejected topics. This
suggests that different exogenous sources offer unique signals that are helpful for a particular set
of topics, but not all. For example, the Venezuela subreddit tends to engage more in discussions
expressing dissatisfaction towards the current government, which may not necessarily be reported in
the news articles. Hence, Reddit features could potentially be more valuable and stronger predictors
than news features for those topics expressing signs of discontent with the Venezuelan government.
Second, we are interested in comparing the user interaction networks of the predicted activity
and the ground truth data, focusing again on each topic independently. For this, we split the events
in the prediction and ground truth dataset by topic. Then, we create a directed retweet network
for each topic in which an edge points from the user who retweeted to the user who posted the
tweet. Finally, we calculate the page rank distributions, and compare the predicted distributions
and ground truth distributions using Earth Movers (EM) metric distance [207].
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We report the performance of network structural measurements in Figure 6.7. Our observations are the following. The page rank distribution of the user interaction networks is closer to the
ground truth than the Sampling baseline method for a majority of topics (as shown in Figures 6.7a,
and 6.7b). For example, our solution records the lowest EM distance values in the three most
popular topic networks compared to both Sampling and Replay baseline (Figures 6.7a).
We also learnt that the network structures predicted by the Replay baseline model are hard
to beat in this network measurement. As we generate cascades starting from the seed user positions
in the user interaction network, the correct seed user assignments matter in our solution to predict
the network structure more accurately. To understand the impact of seed user assignments, we run
the cascade module for the ground truth seeds with the correct authorship information. For a fair
comparison, we keep the same cascade parameters across all solutions. This solution accurately
predicts the page rank distribution for most of the topics (as shown in 6.7d). Since we randomly
select users previously seen in training data, we only predict the long-lived users as seed users who
tend to be more influential in the forecasting period. We believe future improvements on seed user
assignments will improve the overall results on network structural measurements.

6.4

Summary and Discussion
This chapter presents the design and evaluation of a simulator capable of generating realistic

Twitter activity during intense real-world events that lead to peaks of activity and a changing
mixture of popular topics. The simulator uses Twitter data and data from exogenous sources (such as
Reddit and news articles as recorded in GDELT) for training, and produces Twitter activities (with
details on which user tweeted or retweeted when and on what topic) over two weeks during which only
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contemporary exogenous data is available to the simulator. We show on real data collected during
the Venezuela political crisis from January-February 2019 that our simulator generates activities
that follow the ground truth timeseries per topic in terms of message volume and user engagement.
Our code is available for download [194].
Various observations from our effort on this problem may be relevant to researchers focused
on related topics. First, taking into account exogenous data is necessary for simulating the activity of some social media platforms, especially Twitter. What sources of exogenous data are most
representative depends on the topics of interest. For example, we discovered that Reddit conversations more accurately predicted the Twitter activity related to the late president of Venezuela,
who is understandably rarely mentioned in the news. Similarly, Reddit discussions about arrests
mirror better the corresponding Twitter discussions than news articles do, perhaps because they
are emotion-charged. It is possible that taking semantics into account will improve the ability of
forecasting some of the more challenging topics [208, 209].
Second, peaks of activity are difficult to predict. While our solution got the timing of the
peaks right for many topics, we sometimes failed to predict the correct volume. Predicting when
the volume of activity for a topic peaks can have many applications, such as identifying the "Pump
and Dump" group activity in crypto-currency.
Third, we showed that, given the very short reaction time to real-life events, it is important
for researchers to re-evaluate what "the past" means. In particular, restricting exogenous data to
the day previous to the one whose activity is to be predicted is unnecessarily limiting. The "past"
on Twitter is only a few minutes ago. Depending on the time granularity of the predictions sought,
a smaller gap between when the exogenous events took place and the Twitter activity to forecast is
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preferable. We showed there are significant improvements in forecasting accuracy based on previous
day exogenous data when the previous day is shifted to capture the peaks of activity that are likely
to set the tone for the next day.
Fourth, we reached this modular design after many trials experimented over different case
studies. In particular, we experimented in the past with end-to-end machine learning algorithms,
including long-short term memory approaches to better capture trends over time. In our experience,
end-to-end solutions will find the middle ground in the multitude of performance metrics it has to
satisfy, but miss exceptional cases (such as peaks of activity or peaks of new users engagement).
A modular design allows for optimization of the most important dimensions of the simulated data
(such as timing or number of tweets) and can also allow for corrections of unlikely outcomes (such
as more users are predicted to tweet than the number of predicted tweets in some time interval).
Our solution has a number of limitations, some by choice and some related to the results
of our evaluation. We chose not to simulate all types of Twitter actions (such as quoted retweets
and replies) because they make up a small percentage (0.8%) of the total Twitter activity volume.
We also chose to ignore semantic information in order to see how much we can push a general
simulator that might be applicable later to different extractions of topics, and different types of
crisis events. We believe semantic information can contribute to such a simulator and we are
interested in addressing this in future work.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work

Social media data is useful to understand various properties of online communication including polarization [4], influence operations [210], and cross-platform information dissemination [211].
This dissertation contributes to two studies on social network data: protecting the privacy of individuals in publicly available social network data, and simulating online user activity in various
social media platforms.
We proposed a data-driven framework that identifies the relationships between graph vulnerability and graph properties. Specifically, in Chapter 2, we introduced a framework that provides
a quantification of graph vulnerability as measured by the success of a machine-learning based reidentification attack. This framework provides mechanisms to explain the relationship between
graph vulnerability and graph characteristics. Our study shows that protecting graph privacy is
harder than previously considered [10, 11]. For example, previous studies show that preserving the
degree distribution or the degree correlation increases graph vulnerability [41] and thus disturbing
them is a necessary condition for graph anonymization. We show that preserving other network
properties independent of the degree distribution can reveal node identity as well.
In Chapter 3, we improved this framework to measure the cost of graph vulnerability imposed
by the attributes of a labeled graph. We show that the addition of even a single binary attribute to
nodes in a network increases the chance of revealing node identity. Our empirical results show that
graph vulnerability depends on the population diversity with respect to the attributes considered,
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but does not depend on the placement of such attributes biased towards homophily. This improved
understating can guide the data practitioner in selecting anonymization techniques that provide the
appropriate tradeoff between utility and privacy. We make this framework publicly available [42].
The second part of this dissertation contributes to the development of social simulators that
predict social media activity. Specifically, Chapter 4 - 6 present the design of a simulator for a
particular platform that generates realistic user activities.
We proposed a modular design of a simulator to predict finer granular social media activity.
Chapter 5 presents one part of this modular design that generates conversation structures with user
and timing information. We show that the properties of a pool of conversations can be predicted
given only a group of original posts without relying on the initial reactions in the same conversations [115]. Our methods include machine learning algorithms that help to assess the goodness of
the generated conversations with respect to the authorship, timing and structure of a conversation.
Our code is available for download [194].
This solution had two main limitations. First, the model requires the original post information to predict the remainder of a conversation. In an ideal scenario, the simulator would not have
any ground truth information in the testing period. Second, the model can not make predictions
for newly engaged users. In social media platforms like Twitter, a majority of users engaged in
discussions are new (that is, not seen in the past engaged with the same topic of interest).
Chapter 6 presents the overall simulator design that is built from the cascade solution. We
build specialized modules to overcome the limitations presented in the previous solution. First, we
develop a specialized module to predict the original post information. Specifically, we use exogenous
features (such as news articles and posts on Reddit) to predict tweets information (i.e., original posts
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on Twitter). Second, we predict when new users join the discussion by predicting the daily timeseries
of new user engagement. These new users are a subset of the inactive population in social media
discussions, and low degree nodes of the interaction network. These predictions are important when
assigning users to the generated cascades.
We decomposed the simulation problem into various subproblems. For example, we predict
the daily volume of social media discussions (platform-level) per topic (content-level) and distribute
the activity into different user populations (old and new users). Another approach would be to
directly predict the activity streams of individual users, which can be used to estimate the volume
of social media discussions. However, this approach fails when there are millions of users with
different activity patterns (e.g., sparse, bursty, persistent, etc.).
There are various ways that we can improve the performance of a social media activity
simulator. First, there are errors propagated over different modules in a pipeline design. For
example, any error on predicting the volume of discussions can not be resolved later in the pipeline,
as errors are getting accumulated over different modules. Accurately identifying which module
penalizes overall prediction is important to make improvements. How does the improvement made
on the volume predictor impact the network structure predictions? What is the impact of predicting
the rate of new user engagements in predicting the overall volume of discussions? We need to
test the modules independently under different conditions (e.g., a variety of social media datasets,
simulation scenarios, etc.) to check their robustness.
Second, we need to evaluate the usefulness of exogenous features across multiple case studies.
How reliable are the exogenous data sources for predicting the popularity of social media topics
in various social contexts ranging from organic discussions to discussions originated as a part of
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propaganda, influence campaigns? In this line, one can question the reliability of news articles
for predicting social media activity. For example, mainstream and alternative news articles are
shown to promote different topics in a disinformation campaign [212, 210], or the news articles
may be censored as a part of authoritarian propaganda [213]. While we believe the modular design
proposed in this work is generalizable for Twitter activity prediction, we might need to reevaluate
the exogenous features across multiple case studies. There might be new exogenous data sources
that would be more useful in particular cases.
Another direction of future work is to find explanations for the simulator performance. What
characteristics of the data determine the models’ performance? During our performance analysis,
we have seen the simulator performing differently on different topics. This could be partly due to
the influence of external events on the activity of particular topics, or partly due to the regular
patterns observed in the data. For example, we have seen how Reddit messages provide different
perspectives about the on-going Venezuelan political crisis than usually covered in news articles.
On the other hand, there are new patterns emerging in the data that test the generalizability of
simulators. These models learn to simulate according to the way that they have seen the past world
through different data representations. For example, there is a big activity spike in Venezuelan social
media on February 22 due to the humanitarian aid concert. Our simulator has not seen such a spike
in the training data for this particular topic yet manages to predict the spike given the features
extracted from the exogenous sources. In this example, the model interprets the world as seen from
the lens of news articles. This suggests that the model has the ability to learn the fluctuation of
social media activity relative to the exogenous activity. Further work is needed to understand the
data characteristics that can explain the performance of a data-driven simulator. This improved
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understanding would tell us how the models will perform in the future just by looking at data, but
before training any models.
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